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SubjectRe: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms
On Wed, Mar 30, 2022 at 09:12:19AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Wed, 30 Mar 2022 at 09:11, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> wrote:
> > The EFI stub carries out a bunch of actions that have meaningful
> > security impact, and that's material that should be measured. Having the
> > secure launch kernel execute the stub without awareness of what it does
> > means it would need to measure the code without measuring the state,
> > while the goal of DRTM solutions is to measure state rather than the
> > code.
>
> But how is that any different from the early kernel code?

From a conceptual perspective we've thought of the EFI stub as being
logically part of the bootloader rather than the early kernel, and the
bootloader is a point where the line is drawn. My guy feeling is that
jumping into the secure kernel environment before EBS has been called is
likely to end badly.

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