Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 2 Dec 2022 17:33:16 +0300 | From | "Kirill A. Shutemov" <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v5 13/16] x86: decouple PAT and MTRR handling |
| |
On Fri, Dec 02, 2022 at 02:39:58PM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote: > On 02.12.22 14:27, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > > On Fri, Dec 02, 2022 at 06:56:47AM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote: > > > On 02.12.22 00:57, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > > > > On Thu, Dec 01, 2022 at 05:33:28PM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote: > > > > > On 01.12.22 17:26, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, Nov 02, 2022 at 08:47:10AM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote: > > > > > > > Today PAT is usable only with MTRR being active, with some nasty tweaks > > > > > > > to make PAT usable when running as Xen PV guest, which doesn't support > > > > > > > MTRR. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The reason for this coupling is, that both, PAT MSR changes and MTRR > > > > > > > changes, require a similar sequence and so full PAT support was added > > > > > > > using the already available MTRR handling. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Xen PV PAT handling can work without MTRR, as it just needs to consume > > > > > > > the PAT MSR setting done by the hypervisor without the ability and need > > > > > > > to change it. This in turn has resulted in a convoluted initialization > > > > > > > sequence and wrong decisions regarding cache mode availability due to > > > > > > > misguiding PAT availability flags. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Fix all of that by allowing to use PAT without MTRR and by reworking > > > > > > > the current PAT initialization sequence to match better with the newly > > > > > > > introduced generic cache initialization. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This removes the need of the recently added pat_force_disabled flag, so > > > > > > > remove the remnants of the patch adding it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> > > > > > > > > > > > > This patch breaks boot for TDX guest. > > > > > > > > > > > > Kernel now tries to set CR0.CD which is forbidden in TDX guest[1] and > > > > > > causes #VE: > > > > > > > > > > > > tdx: Unexpected #VE: 28 > > > > > > VE fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI > > > > > > CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 6.1.0-rc1-00015-gadfe7512e1d0 #2646 > > > > > > Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 > > > > > > RIP: 0010:native_write_cr0 (arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c:427) > > > > > > Call Trace: > > > > > > <TASK> > > > > > > ? cache_disable (arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h:173 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c:1085) > > > > > > ? cache_cpu_init (arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c:1132 (discriminator 3)) > > > > > > ? setup_arch (arch/x86/kernel/setup.c:1079) > > > > > > ? start_kernel (init/main.c:279 (discriminator 3) init/main.c:477 (discriminator 3) init/main.c:960 (discriminator 3)) > > > > > > ? load_ucode_bsp (arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c:155) > > > > > > ? secondary_startup_64_no_verify (arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:358) > > > > > > </TASK> > > > > > > > > > > > > Any suggestion how to fix it? > > > > > > > > > > > > [1] Section 10.6.1. "CR0", https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/733568 > > > > > > > > > > What was the solution before? > > > > > > > > > > I guess MTRR was disabled, so there was no PAT, too? > > > > > > > > Right: > > > > > > > > Linus' tree: > > > > > > > > [ 0.002589] last_pfn = 0x480000 max_arch_pfn = 0x10000000000 > > > > [ 0.003976] Disabled > > > > [ 0.004452] x86/PAT: MTRRs disabled, skipping PAT initialization too. > > > > [ 0.005856] CPU MTRRs all blank - virtualized system. > > > > [ 0.006915] x86/PAT: Configuration [0-7]: WB WT UC- UC WB WT UC- UC > > > > > > > > tip/master: > > > > > > > > [ 0.003443] last_pfn = 0x20b8e max_arch_pfn = 0x10000000000 > > > > [ 0.005220] Disabled > > > > [ 0.005818] x86/PAT: Configuration [0-7]: WB WC UC- UC WB WP UC- WT > > > > [ 0.007752] tdx: Unexpected #VE: 28 > > > > > > > > The dangling "Disabled" comes mtrr_bp_init(). > > > > > > > > > > > > > If this is the case, you can go the same route as Xen PV guests do. > > > > > > > > Any reason X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR cannot be used instead of > > > > X86_FEATURE_XENPV there? > > > > > > > > Do we have any virtualized platform that supports it? > > > > > > Yes, of course. Any hardware virtualized guest should be able to use it, > > > obviously TDX guests are the first ones not being able to do so. > > > > > > And above dmesg snipplets are showing rather nicely that not disabling > > > PAT completely should be a benefit for TDX guests, as all caching modes > > > would be usable (the PAT MSR seems to be initialized quite fine). > > > > > > Instead of X86_FEATURE_XENPV we could introduce something like > > > X86_FEATURE_PAT_READONLY, which could be set for Xen PV guests and for > > > TDX guests. > > > > Technically, the MSR is writable on TDX. But it seems there's no way to > > properly change it, following the protocol of changing on MP systems. > > Why not? I don't see why it is possible in a non-TDX system, but not within > a TDX guest.
Because the protocol you described below requires setting CR0.CD which is not allowed in TDX guest and causes #VE.
> > Although, I don't quite follow what role cache disabling playing on system > > with self-snoop support. Hm? > > It is the recommended way to do it. See SDM Vol. 3 Chapter 11 ("Memory Cache > Control"): > > The operating system is responsible for insuring that changes to a PAT entry > occur in a manner that maintains the consistency of the processor caches and > translation lookaside buffers (TLB). This is accomplished by following the > procedure as specified in Section 11.11.8, “MTRR Considerations in MP Systems, > ”for changing the value of an MTRR in a multiple processor system. It requires > a specific sequence of operations that includes flushing the processors caches > and TLBs. > > And the sequence for the MTRRs is: > > 1. Broadcast to all processors to execute the following code sequence. > 2. Disable interrupts. > 3. Wait for all processors to reach this point. > 4. Enter the no-fill cache mode. (Set the CD flag in control register CR0 to 1 > and the NW flag to 0.) > 5. Flush all caches using the WBINVD instructions. Note on a processor that > supports self-snooping, CPUID feature flag bit 27, this step is unnecessary. > 6. If the PGE flag is set in control register CR4, flush all TLBs by clearing > that flag. > 7. If the PGE flag is clear in control register CR4, flush all TLBs by executing > a MOV from control register CR3 to another register and then a MOV from that > register back to CR3. > 8. Disable all range registers (by clearing the E flag in register MTRRdefType). > If only variable ranges are being modified, software may clear the valid bits > for the affected register pairs instead. > 9. Update the MTRRs. > 10. Enable all range registers (by setting the E flag in register MTRRdefType). > If only variable-range registers were modified and their individual valid > bits were cleared, then set the valid bits for the affected ranges instead. > 11. Flush all caches and all TLBs a second time. (The TLB flush is required for > Pentium 4, Intel Xeon, and P6 family processors. Executing the WBINVD > instruction is not needed when using Pentium 4, Intel Xeon, and P6 family > processors, but it may be needed in future systems.) > 12. Enter the normal cache mode to re-enable caching. (Set the CD and NW flags > in control register CR0 to 0.) > 13. Set PGE flag in control register CR4, if cleared in Step 6 (above). > 14. Wait for all processors to reach this point. > 15. Enable interrupts. > > So cache disabling is recommended.
Yeah, I read that.
But the question is what kind of scenario cache disabling is actually prevents if self-snoop is supported? In this case cache stays intact (no WBINVD). The next time a cache line gets accessed with different caching mode the old line gets snooped, right?
Would it be valid to avoid touching CR0.CD if X86_FEATURE_SELFSNOOP?
-- Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
| |