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SubjectRe: [PATCH v9 2/8] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine
On Wed, Jan 12, 2022 at 02:41:47PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 20:14 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Tue, 2022-01-11 at 21:26 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > >
> > > > On Jan 11, 2022, at 11:16 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Mon, 2022-01-10 at 23:25 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > > >>> Jarkko, my concern is that once this version of the patch set is
> > > >>> upstreamed, would limiting which keys may be loaded onto the .machine
> > > >>> keyring be considered a regression?
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> Currently certificates built into the kernel do not have a CA restriction on them.
> > > >> IMA will trust anything in this keyring even if the CA bit is not set. While it would
> > > >> be advisable for a kernel to be built with a CA, nothing currently enforces it.
> > > >>
> > > >> My thinking for the dropped CA restriction patches was to introduce a new Kconfig.
> > > >> This Kconfig would do the CA enforcement on the machine keyring. However if the
> > > >> Kconfig option was not set for enforcement, it would work as it does in this series,
> > > >> plus it would allow IMA to work with non-CA keys. This would be done by removing
> > > >> the restriction placed in this patch. Let me know your thoughts on whether this would
> > > >> be an appropriate solution. I believe this would get around what you are identifying as
> > > >> a possible regression.
> > > >
> > > > True the problem currently exists with the builtin keys, but there's a
> > > > major difference between trusting the builtin keys and those being
> > > > loading via MOK. This is an integrity gap that needs to be closed and
> > > > shouldn't be expanded to keys on the .machine keyring.
> > > >
> > > > "plus it would allow IMA to work with non-CA keys" is unacceptable.
> > >
> > > Ok, I’ll leave that part out. Could you clarify the wording I should include in the future
> > > cover letter, which adds IMA support, on why it is unacceptable for the end-user to
> > > make this decision?
> >
> > The Kconfig IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
> > "help" is very clear:
>
> [Reposting the text due to email formatting issues.]
>
> help
> Keys may be added to the IMA or IMA blacklist keyrings, if the
> key is validly signed by a CA cert in the system built-in or
> secondary trusted keyrings.
>
> Intermediate keys between those the kernel has compiled in and the
> IMA keys to be added may be added to the system secondary keyring,
> provided they are validly signed by a key already resident in the
> built-in or secondary trusted keyrings.
>
>
> The first paragraph requires "validly signed by a CA cert in the system
> built-in or secondary trusted keyrings" for keys to be loaded onto the
> IMA keyring. This Kconfig is limited to just the builtin and secondary
> keyrings. Changing this silently to include the ".machine" keyring
> introduces integrity risks that previously did not exist. A new IMA
> Kconfig needs to be defined to allow all three keyrings - builtin,
> machine, and secondary.
>
> The second paragraph implies that only CA and intermediate CA keys are
> on secondary keyring, or as in our case the ".machine" keyring linked
> to the secondary keyring.
>
> Mimi
>
I have also now test environment for this patch set but if there are
any possible changes, I'm waiting for a new version, as it is anyway
for 5.18 cycle earliest.

/Jarkko

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