Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH 00/19] tcp: Initial support for RFC5925 auth option | From | Leonard Crestez <> | Date | Sat, 25 Sep 2021 17:21:14 +0300 |
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On 9/25/21 4:35 AM, David Ahern wrote: > On 9/23/21 1:38 AM, Leonard Crestez wrote: >> On 9/22/21 11:23 PM, Francesco Ruggeri wrote: >>> On Tue, Sep 21, 2021 at 9:15 AM Leonard Crestez <cdleonard@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>>> * Sequence Number Extension not implemented so connections will flap >>>> every ~4G of traffic. >>> >>> Could you expand on this? >>> What exactly do you mean by flap? Will the connection be terminated? >>> I assume that depending on the initial sequence numbers the first flaps >>> may occur well before 4G. >>> Do you use a SNE of 0 in the hash computation, or do you just not include >>> the SNE in it? >> >> SNE is hardcoded to zero, with the logical consequence of incorrect >> signatures on sequence number wrapping. The SNE has to be included >> because otherwise all signatures would be invalid. >> >> You are correct that this can break much sooner than 4G of traffic, but >> still in the GB range on average. I didn't test the exact behavior (not >> clear how) but if signatures don't validate the connection will likely >> timeout. >> > > This is for BGP and LDP connections. What's the expected frequency of > rollover for large FIBs? Seems like it could be fairly often.
Implementing SNE is obviously required for standard conformance, I'm not claiming it is not needed. I will include this in a future version.
I skipped it because it has very few interactions with the rest of the code so it can be implemented separately. Many tests can pass just fine ignoring SNE.
-- Regards, Leonard
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