Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 8 Jun 2021 16:19:31 -0700 | From | Kees Cook <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation |
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On Sat, Jun 05, 2021 at 05:03:57PM +0200, John Wood wrote: > [...] > the kselftest to avoid the detection ;) ). So, in this version, to track > all the statistical data (info related with application crashes), the > extended attributes feature for the executable files are used. The xattr is > also used to mark the executables as "not allowed" when an attack is > detected. Then, the execve system call rely on this flag to avoid following > executions of this file.
I have some concerns about this being actually usable and not creating DoS situations. For example, let's say an attacker had found a hard-to-hit bug in "sudo", and starts brute forcing it. When the brute LSM notices, it'll make "sudo" unusable for the entire system, yes?
And a reboot won't fix it, either, IIUC.
It seems like there is a need to track "user" running "prog", and have that be timed out. Are there use-cases here where that wouldn't be sufficient?
-Kees
-- Kees Cook
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