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SubjectRe: [PATCH v15 00/12] Restricted DMA
On Thu, Jun 24, 2021 at 11:55:14PM +0800, Claire Chang wrote:
> This series implements mitigations for lack of DMA access control on
> systems without an IOMMU, which could result in the DMA accessing the
> system memory at unexpected times and/or unexpected addresses, possibly
> leading to data leakage or corruption.
> For example, we plan to use the PCI-e bus for Wi-Fi and that PCI-e bus is
> not behind an IOMMU. As PCI-e, by design, gives the device full access to
> system memory, a vulnerability in the Wi-Fi firmware could easily escalate
> to a full system exploit (remote wifi exploits: [1a], [1b] that shows a
> full chain of exploits; [2], [3]).
> To mitigate the security concerns, we introduce restricted DMA. Restricted
> DMA utilizes the existing swiotlb to bounce streaming DMA in and out of a
> specially allocated region and does memory allocation from the same region.
> The feature on its own provides a basic level of protection against the DMA
> overwriting buffer contents at unexpected times. However, to protect
> against general data leakage and system memory corruption, the system needs
> to provide a way to restrict the DMA to a predefined memory region (this is
> usually done at firmware level, e.g. MPU in ATF on some ARM platforms [4]).
> [1a]
> [1b]
> [2]
> [3]
> [4]
> v15:
> - Apply Will's diff (
> to fix the crash reported by Qian.
> - Add Stefano's Acked-by tag for patch 01/12 from v14

That all should be now be on
devel/for-linus-5.14 (and linux-next)

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