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SubjectRe: [PATCH v26 22/30] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at 09:17:06AM -0700, Yu, Yu-cheng wrote:
> The lock applies to both shadow stack and ibt. So maybe just "locked"?

Sure.

> vm_munmap() returns error as the following:
>
> (1) -EINVAL: address/size/alignment is wrong.
> For shadow stack, the kernel keeps track of it, this cannot/should not
> happen.

You mean nothing might corrupt

cet->shstk_base
cet->shstk_size

?

I can't count the ways I've heard "should not happen" before and then it
happening anyway.

So probably not but we better catch stuff like that instead of leaking.

> Should it happen, it is a bug.

Ack.

> The kernel can probably do WARN().

Most definitely WARN. You need to catch funsies like that. But WARN_ONCE
should be enough for now.

> (2) -ENOMEM: when doing __split_vma()/__vma_adjust(), kmem_cache_alloc()
> fails.
> Not much we can do. Perhaps WARN()?

You got it.

Bottom line is: if you can check for this and it is cheap, then
definitely. Code changes, gets rewritten, reorganized, the old
assertions change significance, and so on...

Thx.

--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

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