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SubjectRe: [PATCH v7 5/5] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
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On 15/03/2021 17:59, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>
>> On Mar 12, 2021, at 10:12 AM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> wrote:
>>
>> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
>>
>> Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user
>> to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring. This enables to
>> invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or
>> from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain. This also enables to
>> add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.
>>
>> Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been
>> trusted is a sensitive operation. This is why adding new hashes to the
>> blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and
>> vouched by the builtin trusted keyring. A blacklist hash is stored as a
>> key description. The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be
>> provided as the key payload.
>>
>> Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system
>> is running. It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.
>>
>> Update blacklist keyring, blacklist key and revoked certificate access rights:
>> * allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which
>> make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
>> * forbids key update (blacklist and asymmetric ones);
>> * restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the
>> root user rights.
>>
>> See help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
>>
>> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
>> Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
>> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210312171232.2681989-6-mic@digikod.net
>
> I tried testing this, it doesn’t work as I would expect.
> Here is my test setup:
>
> Kernel built with two keys compiled into the builtin_trusted_keys keyring
>
> Generated a tbs cert from one of the keys and signed it with the other key
>
> As root, added the tbs cert hash to the blacklist keyring
>
> Verified the tbs hash is in the blacklist keyring
>
> Enabled lockdown to enforce kernel module signature checking
>
> Signed a kernel module with the key I just blacklisted
>
> Load the kernel module
>
> I’m seeing the kernel module load, I would expect this to fail, since the
> key is now blacklisted. Or is this change just supposed to prevent new keys
> from being added in the future?

This is the expected behavior and the way the blacklist keyring is
currently used, as explained in the commit message:
"This enables to invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded
in a keyring, or from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain."

If you want a (trusted root) key to be untrusted, you need to remove it
from the keyring, which is not allowed for the builtin trusted keyring.

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