Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | Subject | Re: [syzbot] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference in htb_select_queue | From | Eric Dumazet <> | Date | Wed, 10 Mar 2021 18:03:25 +0100 |
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On 3/10/21 3:54 PM, Maxim Mikityanskiy wrote: > On 2021-03-09 17:20, Eric Dumazet wrote: >> >> >> On 3/9/21 4:13 PM, syzbot wrote: >>> Hello, >>> >>> syzbot found the following issue on: >>> >>> HEAD commit: 38b5133a octeontx2-pf: Fix otx2_get_fecparam() >>> git tree: net-next >>> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=166288a8d00000 >>> kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=dbc1ca9e55dc1f9f >>> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b53a709f04722ca12a3c >>> syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=119454ccd00000 >>> >>> The issue was bisected to: >>> >>> commit d03b195b5aa015f6c11988b86a3625f8d5dbac52 >>> Author: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@mellanox.com> >>> Date: Tue Jan 19 12:08:13 2021 +0000 >>> >>> sch_htb: Hierarchical QoS hardware offload >>> >>> bisection log: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=13ab12ecd00000 >>> final oops: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=106b12ecd00000 >>> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=17ab12ecd00000 >>> >>> IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: >>> Reported-by: syzbot+b53a709f04722ca12a3c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com >>> Fixes: d03b195b5aa0 ("sch_htb: Hierarchical QoS hardware offload") >>> >>> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 >>> #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode >>> #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page >>> PGD 183fe067 P4D 183fe067 PUD 21aef067 PMD 0 >>> Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN >>> CPU: 0 PID: 10125 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7-syzkaller #0 >>> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 >>> RIP: 0010:0x0 >>> Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6. >>> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a9c74e8 EFLAGS: 00010246 >>> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92001538e9e RCX: 0000000000000000 >>> RDX: ffffc9000a9c7520 RSI: 0000000000000012 RDI: ffff88802d158000 >>> RBP: ffff88802d158000 R08: 00000000fffffff1 R09: 0000000000000400 >>> R10: ffffffff871631c4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff89ea6b40 >>> R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888012b79c00 R15: 00000000ffff0000 >>> FS: 00007f73f9698700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 >>> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 >>> CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000173b5000 CR4: 00000000001506f0 >>> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 >>> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 >>> Call Trace: >>> htb_offload net/sched/sch_htb.c:1011 [inline] >>> htb_select_queue+0x17f/0x2c0 net/sched/sch_htb.c:1349 >>> tc_modify_qdisc+0x44a/0x1a50 net/sched/sch_api.c:1657 >>> rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xad0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5553 >>> netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502 >>> netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline] >>> netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338 >>> netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927 >>> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] >>> sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672 >>> ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2348 >>> ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2402 >>> __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2435 >>> do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 >>> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 >>> RIP: 0033:0x466019 >>> Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 >>> RSP: 002b:00007f73f9698188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e >>> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000056bf60 RCX: 0000000000466019 >>> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200007c0 RDI: 0000000000000004 >>> RBP: 00000000004bd067 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 >>> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000056bf60 >>> R13: 00007fffefccc11f R14: 00007f73f9698300 R15: 0000000000022000 >>> Modules linked in: >>> CR2: 0000000000000000 >>> ---[ end trace e1544e8206616773 ]--- >>> RIP: 0010:0x0 >>> Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6. >>> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a9c74e8 EFLAGS: 00010246 >>> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92001538e9e RCX: 0000000000000000 >>> RDX: ffffc9000a9c7520 RSI: 0000000000000012 RDI: ffff88802d158000 >>> RBP: ffff88802d158000 R08: 00000000fffffff1 R09: 0000000000000400 >>> R10: ffffffff871631c4 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff89ea6b40 >>> R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888012b79c00 R15: 00000000ffff0000 >>> FS: 00007f73f9698700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 >>> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 >>> CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000173b5000 CR4: 00000000001506e0 >>> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 >>> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 >>> >>> >>> --- >>> This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors. >>> See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot. >>> syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com. >>> >>> syzbot will keep track of this issue. See: >>> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot. >>> For information about bisection process see: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#bisection >>> syzbot can test patches for this issue, for details see: >>> https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#testing-patches >>> >> >> >> Hmm... what about this : >> >> diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c >> index f87d07736a1404edcfd17a792321758cd4bdd173..680afb5bfe2294a5531c7aaeed698b95ea3ab20c 100644 >> --- a/net/sched/sch_api.c >> +++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c >> @@ -1651,15 +1651,16 @@ static int tc_modify_qdisc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n, >> err = -ENOENT; >> } >> } else { >> - struct netdev_queue *dev_queue; >> + struct netdev_queue *dev_queue = NULL; >> if (p && p->ops->cl_ops && p->ops->cl_ops->select_queue) >> dev_queue = p->ops->cl_ops->select_queue(p, tcm); >> - else if (p) >> - dev_queue = p->dev_queue; >> - else >> - dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, 0); >> - >> + if (!dev_queue) { >> + if (p) >> + dev_queue = p->dev_queue; >> + else >> + dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, 0); >> + } >> q = qdisc_create(dev, dev_queue, p, >> tcm->tcm_parent, tcm->tcm_handle, >> tca, &err, extack); >> diff --git a/net/sched/sch_htb.c b/net/sched/sch_htb.c >> index dff3adf5a9156c2412c64a10ad1b2ce9e1367433..cc6eccd688701ae00255f07e32fb4b0efbaf45ce 100644 >> --- a/net/sched/sch_htb.c >> +++ b/net/sched/sch_htb.c >> @@ -1008,6 +1008,8 @@ static void htb_set_lockdep_class_child(struct Qdisc *q) >> static int htb_offload(struct net_device *dev, struct tc_htb_qopt_offload *opt) >> { >> + if (!tc_can_offload(dev) || !dev->netdev_ops->ndo_setup_tc) >> + return -EOPNOTSUPP; > > My fault, all calls to htb_offload must be protected by if (q->offload). Rather than checking tc_can_offload and ndo_setup_tc in htb_offload every time, I suggest to fix htb_select_queue: > > diff --git a/net/sched/sch_htb.c b/net/sched/sch_htb.c > index dff3adf5a915..b23203159996 100644 > --- a/net/sched/sch_htb.c > +++ b/net/sched/sch_htb.c > @@ -1340,8 +1340,12 @@ htb_select_queue(struct Qdisc *sch, struct tcmsg *tcm) > { > struct net_device *dev = qdisc_dev(sch); > struct tc_htb_qopt_offload offload_opt; > + struct htb_sched *q = qdisc_priv(sch); > int err; > > + if (!q->offload) > + return sch->dev_queue; > + > offload_opt = (struct tc_htb_qopt_offload) { > .command = TC_HTB_LEAF_QUERY_QUEUE, > .classid = TC_H_MIN(tcm->tcm_parent), > > htb_init ensures that tc_can_offload and ndo_setup_tc are checked if q->offload is true. Also, we can avoid changing tc_modify_qdisc if htb_select_queue mimics its behavior in non-offload mode, as shown above. > > There is also a case where htb_select_queue returns NULL on errors, and that is handled in qdisc_create (the error message will be "No device queue given"), which I think is a sane behavior. > > What do you think of this fix? If it fits, I'll send it as a patch.
I think that it is not enough, since you overwrite q->offload in htb_init() even if an error will be provided.
So a malicious user will find its way.
You probably also need this :
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_htb.c b/net/sched/sch_htb.c index dff3adf5a9156c2412c64a10ad1b2ce9e1367433..d15ee7cf33b34221d09dfc81105dcb6c2b2fd489 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_htb.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_htb.c @@ -1020,6 +1020,7 @@ static int htb_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt, struct nlattr *tb[TCA_HTB_MAX + 1]; struct tc_htb_glob *gopt; unsigned int ntx; + bool offload; int err; qdisc_watchdog_init(&q->watchdog, sch); @@ -1044,9 +1045,9 @@ static int htb_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt, if (gopt->version != HTB_VER >> 16) return -EINVAL; - q->offload = nla_get_flag(tb[TCA_HTB_OFFLOAD]); + offload = nla_get_flag(tb[TCA_HTB_OFFLOAD]); - if (q->offload) { + if (offload) { if (sch->parent != TC_H_ROOT) return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -1060,6 +1061,7 @@ static int htb_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt, if (!q->direct_qdiscs) return -ENOMEM; } + q->offload = offload; err = qdisc_class_hash_init(&q->clhash); if (err < 0)
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