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    Subject[PATCH 5.4 117/340] crypto: ecdh_helper - Ensure len >= secret.len in decode_key()
    Date
    From: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@intel.com>

    [ Upstream commit a53ab94eb6850c3657392e2d2ce9b38c387a2633 ]

    The length ('len' parameter) passed to crypto_ecdh_decode_key() is never
    checked against the length encoded in the passed buffer ('buf'
    parameter). This could lead to an out-of-bounds access when the passed
    length is less than the encoded length.

    Add a check to prevent that.

    Fixes: 3c4b23901a0c7 ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support")
    Signed-off-by: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@intel.com>
    Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
    Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
    ---
    crypto/ecdh_helper.c | 3 +++
    1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

    diff --git a/crypto/ecdh_helper.c b/crypto/ecdh_helper.c
    index 66fcb2ea81544..fca63b559f655 100644
    --- a/crypto/ecdh_helper.c
    +++ b/crypto/ecdh_helper.c
    @@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ int crypto_ecdh_decode_key(const char *buf, unsigned int len,
    if (secret.type != CRYPTO_KPP_SECRET_TYPE_ECDH)
    return -EINVAL;

    + if (unlikely(len < secret.len))
    + return -EINVAL;
    +
    ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(&params->curve_id, ptr, sizeof(params->curve_id));
    ptr = ecdh_unpack_data(&params->key_size, ptr, sizeof(params->key_size));
    if (secret.len != crypto_ecdh_key_len(params))
    --
    2.27.0


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