Messages in this thread |  | | Subject | Re: [RFC v1 05/26] x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest | From | Dave Hansen <> | Date | Fri, 12 Feb 2021 12:17:02 -0800 |
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On 2/12/21 12:06 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote: >> What happens if the guest attempts to access a secure GPA that is not >> ACCEPTed? For example, suppose the VMM does THH.MEM.PAGE.REMOVE on a secure >> address and the guest accesses it, via instruction fetch or data access. >> What happens? > Well, as currently written in the spec, it will generate an EPT violation and > the host will have no choice but to kill the guest.
That's actually perfect behavior from my perspective. Host does something stupid. Host gets left holding the pieces. No enabling to do in the guest.
This doesn't *preclude* the possibility that the VMM and guest could establish a protocol to remove guest pages. It just means that the host can't go it alone and that if they guest and host get out of sync, the guest dies.
In other words, I think I'm rooting for the docs, as written. :)
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