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Subject[PATCH 1/4] perf/core: Add support to exclude kernel mode instruction tracing
Date
Hardware assisted tracing families such as ARM Coresight, Intel PT
provides rich tracing capabilities including instruction level
tracing and accurate timestamps which are very useful for profiling
and also pose a significant security risk. One such example of
security risk is when kernel mode tracing is not excluded and these
hardware assisted tracing can be used to analyze cryptographic code
execution. In this case, even the root user must not be able to infer
anything.

To explain it more clearly in the words of a security team member
(credits: Mattias Nissler),

"Consider a system where disk contents are encrypted and the encryption
key is set up by the user when mounting the file system. From that point
on the encryption key resides in the kernel. It seems reasonable to
expect that the disk encryption key be protected from exfiltration even
if the system later suffers a root compromise (or even against insiders
that have root access), at least as long as the attacker doesn't
manage to compromise the kernel."

Here the idea is to protect such important information from all users
including root users since root privileges does not have to mean full
control over the kernel [1] and root compromise does not have to be
the end of the world.

Currently we can exclude kernel mode tracing via perf_event_paranoid
sysctl but it has following limitations,

* It is applicable to all PMUs and not just the ones supporting
instruction tracing.
* No option to restrict kernel mode instruction tracing by the
root user.
* Not possible to restrict kernel mode instruction tracing when the
hardware assisted tracing IPs like ARM Coresight ETMs use an
additional interface via sysfs for tracing in addition to perf
interface.

So introduce a new config CONFIG_EXCLUDE_KERNEL_HW_ITRACE to exclude
kernel mode instruction tracing which will be generic and applicable
to all hardware tracing families and which can also be used with other
interfaces like sysfs in case of ETMs.

[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/796866/

Suggested-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Suggested-by: Al Grant <al.grant@arm.com>
Tested-by: Denis Nikitin <denik@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201015124522.1876-1-saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org/
Signed-off-by: Sai Prakash Ranjan <saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org>
---
init/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
kernel/events/core.c | 6 ++++++
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)

diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index af454a51f3c5..31b4d1f26bce 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1832,6 +1832,18 @@ config DEBUG_PERF_USE_VMALLOC

endmenu

+config EXCLUDE_KERNEL_HW_ITRACE
+ bool "Exclude kernel mode hardware assisted instruction tracing"
+ depends on PERF_EVENTS
+ help
+ Exclude kernel mode instruction tracing by hardware tracing
+ family such as ARM Coresight ETM, Intel PT and so on.
+
+ This option allows to disable kernel mode instruction tracing
+ offered by hardware assisted tracing for all users(including root)
+ especially for production systems where only userspace tracing might
+ be preferred for security reasons.
+
config VM_EVENT_COUNTERS
default y
bool "Enable VM event counters for /proc/vmstat" if EXPERT
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index aece2fe19693..044a774cef6d 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -11866,6 +11866,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
goto err_task;
}

+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EXCLUDE_KERNEL_HW_ITRACE) &&
+ (event->pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_ITRACE) && !attr.exclude_kernel) {
+ err = -EACCES;
+ goto err_alloc;
+ }
+
if (is_sampling_event(event)) {
if (event->pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_INTERRUPT) {
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
--
QUALCOMM INDIA, on behalf of Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a member
of Code Aurora Forum, hosted by The Linux Foundation
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