| From | Greg Kroah-Hartman <> | Subject | [PATCH 4.19 41/77] crypto: ecdh - avoid buffer overflow in ecdh_set_secret() | Date | Mon, 11 Jan 2021 14:01:50 +0100 |
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From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
commit 0aa171e9b267ce7c52d3a3df7bc9c1fc0203dec5 upstream.
Pavel reports that commit 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()") fixes one problem but introduces another: the unconditional memcpy() introduced by that commit may overflow the target buffer if the source data is invalid, which could be the result of intentional tampering.
So check params.key_size explicitly against the size of the target buffer before validating the key further.
Fixes: 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()") Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
--- crypto/ecdh.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/crypto/ecdh.c +++ b/crypto/ecdh.c @@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ static int ecdh_set_secret(struct crypto struct ecdh params; unsigned int ndigits; - if (crypto_ecdh_decode_key(buf, len, ¶ms) < 0) + if (crypto_ecdh_decode_key(buf, len, ¶ms) < 0 || + params.key_size > sizeof(ctx->private_key)) return -EINVAL; ndigits = ecdh_supported_curve(params.curve_id);
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