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SubjectRe: [PATCH -next for tip:x86/pti] x86/tlb: drop unneeded local vars in enable_l1d_flush_for_task()
On Wed, Sep 30 2020 at 20:35, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 08:00:59PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> On Wed, Sep 30 2020 at 19:03, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>> > On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 05:40:08PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> > Also, that preempt_disable() in there doesn't actually do anything.
>> > Worse, preempt_disable(); for_each_cpu(); is an anti-pattern. It mixes
>> > static_cpu_has() and boot_cpu_has() in the same bloody condition and has
>> > a pointless ret variable.
> Also, I forgot to add, it accesses ->cpus_mask without the proper
> locking, so it could be reading intermediate state from whatever cpumask
> operation that's in progress.

Yes. I saw that after hitting send. :(

>> I absolutely agree and I really missed it when looking at it before
>> merging. cpus_read_lock()/unlock() is the right thing to do if at all.
>> > It's shoddy code, that only works if you align the planets right. We
>> > really shouldn't provide interfaces that are this bad.
>> >
>> > It's correct operation is only by accident.
>> True :(
>> I understand Balbirs problem and it makes some sense to provide a
>> solution. We can:
>> 1) reject set_affinity() if the task has that flush muck enabled
>> and user space tries to move it to a SMT enabled core
>> 2) disable the muck if if detects that it is runs on a SMT enabled
>> core suddenly (hotplug says hello)
>> This one is nasty because there is no feedback to user space
>> about the wreckage.
> That's and, right, not or. because 1) deals with sched_setffinity()
> and 2) deals wit hotplug.

It was meant as AND of course.

> Now 1) requires an arch hook in sched_setaffinity(), something I'm not
> keen on providing, once we provide it, who knows what strange and
> wonderful things archs will dream up.

I don't think so. We can have that magic in core:

static bool paranoid_l1d_valid(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cpumask *msk)
if (!test_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH))
return true;
/* Do magic stuff */
return res;
static bool paranoid_l1d_valid(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cpumask *msk)
return true;

It's a pretty well defined problem and having the magic in core code
prevents an arch hook which allows abuse of all sorts.

And the same applies to enable_l1d_flush_for_task(). The only
architecture specific nonsense are the checks whether the CPU bug is
there and whether the hardware supports L1D flushing.

So we can have:

int paranoid_l1d_enable(struct task_struct *tsk)
/* Do the SMT validation under the proper locks */
if (!res)
set_task_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH);
return res;

> And 2) also happens on hot-un-plug, when the task's affinity gets
> forced because it became empty. No user feedback there either, and
> information is lost.

Of course. It's both that suddenly SMT gets enabled on a core which was
isolated and when the last isolated core in the tasks CPU mask goes

> I suppose we can do 2) but send a signal. That would cover all cases and
> keep it in arch code. But yes, that's pretty terrible too.

Bah. I just looked at the condition to flush:

if (sched_smt_active() && !this_cpu_read(cpu_info.smt_active) &&
(prev_mm & LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH))

That fails to flush when SMT is disabled globally. Balbir?

Of course this should be:

if (!this_cpu_read(cpu_info.smt_active) && (prev_mm & LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH))

Now we can make this:

if (unlikely(prev_mm & LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH)) {
if (!this_cpu_read(cpu_info.smt_active))

And that task work clears the flag and sends a signal. We're not going
to send a signal from switch_mm() ....



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