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SubjectRe: [PATCH v38 10/24] mm: Add vm_ops->mprotect()
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On 9/24/20 12:28 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 02:11:37PM -0500, Haitao Huang wrote:
>> On Wed, 23 Sep 2020 08:50:56 -0500, Jarkko Sakkinen
>> <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>>> I'll categorically deny noexec in the next patch set version.
>>>
>>> /Jarkko
>> There are use cases supported currently in which enclave binary is received
>> via IPC/RPC and held in buffers before EADD. Denying noexec altogether would
>> break those, right?
> No. noexec only applies to file-backed VMAs, what you're describing is loading
> an enclave from an anon VMA, which will still have VM_MAYEXEC.

Maybe I'm just stupid, but I still don't get the scenario that's being
thwarted or why it is valuable. The SDM is worthless on what EMODPE
does or what its restrictions are.

In pseudo-C, it's something logically like this for the "nice" case:

ptr = mmap("/some/executable", PROT_EXEC);
ioctl(sgx_fd, ADD_ENCLAVE_PAGE, SGX_PROT_EXEC, ptr, size);
mmap(sgx_fd);
EENTER;

And we're trying to thwart:

ptr = mmap("/mnt/noexec/file", PROT_READ);
ioctl(sgx_fd, ADD_ENCLAVE_PAGE, SGX_PROT_EXEC, ptr, size);
mmap(sgx_fd);
EENTER;

because that loads data into the enclave which is executable but which
was not executable normally. But, we're allowing this from anonymous
memory, so this would seem to work:

ptr = mmap("/mnt/noexec/file", PROT_READ);
buffer = malloc(PAGE_SIZE);
memcpy(buffer, ptr, PAGE_SIZE);
// need mprotect(buf, PROT_EXEC)???
ioctl(sgx_fd, ADD_ENCLAVE_PAGE, SGX_PROT_EXEC, buffer, size);
mmap(sgx_fd);
EENTER;

and give the same result. What am I missing?

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