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SubjectRe: [PATCH v12 1/8] x86/cet/ibt: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Indirect Branch Tracking
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Hi,

If you do another version of this:

On 9/18/20 12:23 PM, Yu-cheng Yu wrote:
> Introduce Kconfig option X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER.
>
> Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against CALL-/JMP-
> oriented programming attacks. It is active when the kernel has this
> feature enabled, and the processor and the application support it.
> When this feature is enabled, legacy non-IBT applications continue to
> work, but without IBT protection.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> ---
> v10:
> - Change build-time CET check to config depends on.
>
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index 6b6dad011763..b047e0a8d1c2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -1963,6 +1963,22 @@ config X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER
>
> If unsure, say y.
>
> +config X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER
> + prompt "Intel Indirect Branch Tracking for user-mode"
> + def_bool n
> + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
> + depends on $(cc-option,-fcf-protection)
> + select X86_INTEL_CET
> + help
> + Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT) provides protection against
> + CALL-/JMP-oriented programming attacks. It is active when
> + the kernel has this feature enabled, and the processor and
> + the application support it. When this feature is enabled,
> + legacy non-IBT applications continue to work, but without
> + IBT protection.
> +
> + If unsure, say y

If unsure, say y.

> +
> config EFI
> bool "EFI runtime service support"
> depends on ACPI
>


--
~Randy

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