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    SubjectRe: [PATCH] x86/entry/64: Disallow RDPID in paranoid entry if KVM is enabled
    On Thu, Aug 20, 2020 at 07:50:50PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
    > diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
    > index 70dea93378162..fd915c46297c5 100644
    > --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
    > +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
    > @@ -842,8 +842,13 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry)
    > *
    > * The MSR write ensures that no subsequent load is based on a
    > * mispredicted GSBASE. No extra FENCE required.
    > + *
    > + * Disallow RDPID if KVM is enabled as it may consume a guest's TSC_AUX
    > + * if an NMI arrives in KVM's run loop. KVM loads guest's TSC_AUX on
    > + * VM-Enter and may not restore the host's value until the CPU returns
    > + * to userspace, i.e. KVM depends on the kernel not using TSC_AUX.
    > */
    > - SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%rbx
    > + SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%rbx no_rdpid=IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM)
    > ret

    With distro configs that's going to be a guaranteed no_rdpid. Also with
    a grand total of 0 performance numbers that RDPID is even worth it, I'd
    suggest to just unconditionally remove that thing. Simpler code
    all-around.

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