Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | From | Greg Kroah-Hartman <> | Subject | [PATCH 4.4 097/149] Smack: prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso() | Date | Thu, 20 Aug 2020 11:22:54 +0200 |
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From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 42a2df3e829f3c5562090391b33714b2e2e5ad4a ]
We have an upper bound on "maplevel" but forgot to check for negative values.
Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> --- security/smack/smackfs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index 2e2ef3a525ecb..df082648eb0aa 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &maplevel); - if (ret != 1 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL) + if (ret != 1 || maplevel < 0 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL) goto out; rule += SMK_DIGITLEN; -- 2.25.1
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