Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH v6 09/15] iommu/vt-d: Check ownership for PASIDs from user-space | From | Auger Eric <> | Date | Sat, 15 Aug 2020 18:30:27 +0200 |
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Hi Yi,
On 7/28/20 8:27 AM, Liu Yi L wrote: > When an IOMMU domain with nesting attribute is used for guest SVA, a > system-wide PASID is allocated for binding with the device and the domain. > For security reason, we need to check the PASID passed from user-space. > e.g. page table bind/unbind and PASID related cache invalidation. > > Cc: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com> > CC: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com> > Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> > Cc: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com> > Cc: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org> > Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> > Cc: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@intel.com> > Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com> > --- > drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 10 ++++++++++ > drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c | 7 +++++-- > 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c > index b2fe54e..88f4647 100644 > --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c > +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c > @@ -5436,6 +5436,7 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev, > int granu = 0; > u64 pasid = 0; > u64 addr = 0; > + void *pdata; > > granu = to_vtd_granularity(cache_type, inv_info->granularity); > if (granu == -EINVAL) { > @@ -5456,6 +5457,15 @@ intel_iommu_sva_invalidate(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev, > (inv_info->granu.addr_info.flags & IOMMU_INV_ADDR_FLAGS_PASID)) > pasid = inv_info->granu.addr_info.pasid; > > + pdata = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL); > + if (!pdata) { > + ret = -EINVAL; > + goto out_unlock; > + } else if (IS_ERR(pdata)) { > + ret = PTR_ERR(pdata); > + goto out_unlock; > + } > + > switch (BIT(cache_type)) { > case IOMMU_CACHE_INV_TYPE_IOTLB: > /* HW will ignore LSB bits based on address mask */ > diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c > index c85b8d5..b9b29ad 100644 > --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c > +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/svm.c > @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ int intel_svm_bind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, struct device *dev, > dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain); > > mutex_lock(&pasid_mutex); > - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, data->hpasid, NULL); > + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, data->hpasid, NULL); A question about the locking strategy. We don't take the device_domain_lock here. Could you clarify whether it is safe?
> if (IS_ERR(svm)) { > ret = PTR_ERR(svm); > goto out; > @@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, > struct device *dev, u32 pasid) > { > struct intel_iommu *iommu = intel_svm_device_to_iommu(dev); > + struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain; > struct intel_svm_dev *sdev; > struct intel_svm *svm; > int ret = -EINVAL; > @@ -447,8 +448,10 @@ int intel_svm_unbind_gpasid(struct iommu_domain *domain, > if (WARN_ON(!iommu)) > return -EINVAL; > > + dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain); > + > mutex_lock(&pasid_mutex); > - svm = ioasid_find(INVALID_IOASID_SET, pasid, NULL); > + svm = ioasid_find(dmar_domain->ioasid_sid, pasid, NULL); same here. > if (!svm) { > ret = -EINVAL; > goto out; > Thanks
Eric
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