lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2020]   [May]   [7]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: [PATCH v2] kernel: add panic_on_taint
On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 06:50:46PM +0000, Luis Chamberlain wrote:
> On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 02:06:31PM -0400, Rafael Aquini wrote:
> > Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be
> > as a mean for assuring a security policy (in paranoid mode)
> > case where no single taint is allowed for the running system.
>
> If used for this purpose then we must add a new TAINT flag for
> proc_taint() was used, otherwise we can cheat to show a taint
> *did* happen, where in fact it never happened, some punk just
> echo'd a value into the kernel's /proc/sys/kernel/tainted.
>

To accomplish that, the punk would need to be root, though, in which
case everything else is doomed, already.

> Forunately proc_taint() only allows to *increment* the taint, not
> reduce.
>
> Luis
>

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2020-05-07 20:53    [W:0.064 / U:0.260 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site