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SubjectRe: [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE
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On 5/27/2020 6:48 AM, Adrian Reber wrote:
> On Mon, May 25, 2020 at 11:55:20AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 5/25/2020 1:05 AM, Adrian Reber wrote:
>>> On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 09:40:37AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>>> On 5/21/2020 10:53 PM, Adrian Reber wrote:
>>>>> This enables CRIU to checkpoint and restore a process as non-root.
>>>> I know it sounds pedantic, but could you spell out CRIU once?
>>>> While I know that everyone who cares either knows or can guess
>>>> what you're talking about, it may be a mystery to some of the
>>>> newer kernel developers.
>>> Sure. CRIU - Checkpoint/Restore In Userspace.
>> Thanks. I blew out my acronym processor in the 1990's while
>> working on trusted Unix system security evaluations.
>>
>>>>> Over the last years CRIU upstream has been asked a couple of time if it
>>>>> is possible to checkpoint and restore a process as non-root. The answer
>>>>> usually was: 'almost'.
>>>>>
>>>>> The main blocker to restore a process was that selecting the PID of the
>>>>> restored process, which is necessary for CRIU, is guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
>>>> What are the other blockers? Are you going to suggest additional new
>>>> capabilities to clear them?
>>> As mentioned somewhere else access to /proc/<pid>/map_files/ would be
>>> helpful. Right now I am testing with a JVM and it works without root
>>> just with the attached patch. Without access to /proc/<pid>/map_files/
>>> not everything CRIU can do will actually work, but we are a lot closer
>>> to what our users have been asking for.
>> Are you talking about read access to map_files owned by other users
>> or write access to map_files for the current user?
> If I understand part of CRIU correctly, then we only need read-access
> for the current user. I am sure Andrei, Pavel or Cyrill will correct me
> if I am wrong concerning map_files.

If I do "ls -l /proc/self/map_files" I get the link name and link content.
While I can't open /proc/self/map_files/7fbde0c3200-7fbde0c3300 I can read
that it points to /usr/lib64/ld-2.30.so, which is something I can open
and read. Sure, it's an extra step, but it's no big deal. It does raise the
question of what value comes from disallowing open via the symlink.


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