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SubjectRe: [PATCH] iommu: Relax ACS requirement for RCiEP devices.
On Tue, 26 May 2020 11:06:48 -0700
"Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@intel.com> wrote:

> Hi Alex,
>
> I was able to find better language in the IOMMU spec that gaurantees
> the behavior we need. See below.
>
>
> On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 09:34:14AM -0600, Alex Williamson wrote:
> > On Tue, 5 May 2020 07:56:06 -0700
> > "Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > > On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 08:05:14AM -0600, Alex Williamson wrote:
> > > > On Mon, 4 May 2020 23:11:07 -0700
> > > > "Raj, Ashok" <ashok.raj@intel.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Hi Alex
> > > > >
> > > > > + Joerg, accidently missed in the Cc.
> > > > >
> > > > > On Mon, May 04, 2020 at 11:19:36PM -0600, Alex Williamson wrote:
> > > > > > On Mon, 4 May 2020 21:42:16 -0700
> > > > > > Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > PCIe Spec recommends we can relax ACS requirement for RCIEP devices.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > PCIe 5.0 Specification.
> > > > > > > 6.12 Access Control Services (ACS)
> > > > > > > Implementation of ACS in RCiEPs is permitted but not required. It is
> > > > > > > explicitly permitted that, within a single Root Complex, some RCiEPs
> > > > > > > implement ACS and some do not. It is strongly recommended that Root Complex
> > > > > > > implementations ensure that all accesses originating from RCiEPs
> > > > > > > (PFs and VFs) without ACS capability are first subjected to processing by
> > > > > > > the Translation Agent (TA) in the Root Complex before further decoding and
> > > > > > > processing. The details of such Root Complex handling are outside the scope
> > > > > > > of this specification.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Is the language here really strong enough to make this change? ACS is
> > > > > > an optional feature, so being permitted but not required is rather
> > > > > > meaningless. The spec is also specifically avoiding the words "must"
> > > > > > or "shall" and even when emphasized with "strongly", we still only have
> > > > > > a recommendation that may or may not be honored. This seems like a
> > > > > > weak basis for assuming that RCiEPs universally honor this
> > > > > > recommendation. Thanks,
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > We are speaking about PCIe spec, where people write it about 5 years ahead
> > > > > and every vendor tries to massage their product behavior with vague
> > > > > words like this.. :)
> > > > >
> > > > > But honestly for any any RCiEP, or even integrated endpoints, there
> > > > > is no way to send them except up north. These aren't behind a RP.
> > > >
> > > > But they are multi-function devices and the spec doesn't define routing
> > > > within multifunction packages. A single function RCiEP will already be
> > > > assumed isolated within its own group.
> > >
> > > That's right. The other two devices only have legacy PCI headers. So
> > > they can't claim to be RCiEP's but just integrated endpoints. The legacy
> > > devices don't even have a PCIe header.
> > >
> > > I honestly don't know why these are groped as MFD's in the first place.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > > I did check with couple folks who are part of the SIG, and seem to agree
> > > > > that ACS treatment for RCiEP's doesn't mean much.
> > > > >
> > > > > I understand the language isn't strong, but it doesn't seem like ACS should
> > > > > be a strong requirement for RCiEP's and reasonable to relax.
> > > > >
> > > > > What are your thoughts?
> > > >
> > > > I think hardware vendors have ACS at their disposal to clarify when
> > > > isolation is provided, otherwise vendors can submit quirks, but I don't
> > > > see that the "strongly recommended" phrasing is sufficient to assume
> > > > isolation between multifunction RCiEPs. Thanks,
> > >
> > > You point is that integrated MFD endpoints, without ACS, there is no
> > > gaurantee to SW that they are isolated.
> > >
> > > As far as a quirk, do you think:
> > > - a cmdline optput for integrated endpoints, and RCiEP's suffice?
> > > along with a compile time default that is strict enforcement
> > > - typical vid/did type exception list?
> > >
> > > A more generic way to ask for exception would be scalable until we can stop
> > > those type of integrated devices. Or we need to maintain these device lists
> > > for eternity.
> >
> > I don't think the language in the spec is anything sufficient to handle
> > RCiEP uniquely. We've previously rejected kernel command line opt-outs
> > for ACS, and the extent to which those patches still float around the
> > user community and are blindly used to separate IOMMU groups are a
> > testament to the failure of this approach. Users do not have a basis
> > for enabling this sort of opt-out. The benefit is obvious in the IOMMU
> > grouping, but the risk is entirely unknown. A kconfig option is even
> > worse as that means if you consume a downstream kernel, the downstream
> > maintainers might have decided universally that isolation is less
> > important than functionality.
>
> We discussed this internally, and Intel vt-d spec does spell out clearly
> in Section 3.16 Root-Complex Peer to Peer Considerations. The spec clearly
> calls out that all p2p must be done on translated addresses and therefore
> must go through the IOMMU.
>
> I suppose they should also have some similar platform gauranteed behavior
> for RCiEP's or MFD's *Must* behave as follows. The language is strict and
> when IOMMU is enabled in the platform, everything is sent up north to the
> IOMMU agent.
>
> 3.16 Root-Complex Peer to Peer Considerations
> When DMA remapping is enabled, peer-to-peer requests through the
> Root-Complex must be handled
> as follows:
> • The input address in the request is translated (through first-level,
> second-level or nested translation) to a host physical address (HPA).
> The address decoding for peer addresses must be done only on the
> translated HPA. Hardware implementations are free to further limit
> peer-to-peer accesses to specific host physical address regions
> (or to completely disallow peer-forwarding of translated requests).
> • Since address translation changes the contents (address field) of the PCI
> Express Transaction Layer Packet (TLP), for PCI Express peer-to-peer
> requests with ECRC, the Root-Complex hardware must use the new ECRC
> (re-computed with the translated address) if it decides to forward
> the TLP as a peer request.
> • Root-ports, and multi-function root-complex integrated endpoints, may
> support additional peerto-peer control features by supporting PCI Express
> Access Control Services (ACS) capability. Refer to ACS capability in
> PCI Express specifications for details.

That sounds like it might be a reasonable basis for quirking all RCiEPs
on VT-d platforms if Intel is willing to stand behind it. Thanks,

Alex

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