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SubjectRe: [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE
On 5/22/2020 9:27 PM, Andrei Vagin wrote:
> On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 09:40:37AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 5/21/2020 10:53 PM, Adrian Reber wrote:
>>> There are probably a few more things guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN required
>>> to run checkpoint/restore as non-root,
>> If you need CAP_SYS_ADMIN anyway you're not gaining anything by
>> separating out CAP_RESTORE.
>>> but by applying this patch I can
>>> already checkpoint and restore processes as non-root. As there are
>>> already multiple workarounds I would prefer to do it correctly in the
>>> kernel to avoid that CRIU users are starting to invent more workarounds.
>> You've presented a couple of really inappropriate implementations
>> that would qualify as workarounds. But the other two are completely
>> appropriate within the system security policy. They don't "get around"
>> the problem, they use existing mechanisms as they are intended.
> With CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, we will need to use the same mechanisms.

Then why call them out as objectionable "workarounds"?

> The problem is that CAP_SYS_ADMIN is too wide.

This is well understood, and irrelevant.

If we broke out CAP_SYS_ADMIN properly we'd have hundreds of
capabilities, and no one would be able to manage the capability
sets on anything. Just breaking out of CAP_SYS_ADMIN, especially
if the process is going to need other capabilities anyway, gains
you nothing.

> If a process has
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN, it can do a lot of things and the operation of forking a
> process with a specified pid isn't the most dangerous one in this case.
> Offten security policies don't allow to grant CAP_SYS_ADMIN to any
> third-party tools even in non-root user namespaces.

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