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SubjectRe: [PATCH 3/4] x86,module: Detect VMX vs SLD conflicts
On Tue, Apr 07, 2020 at 05:24:12PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 07, 2020 at 04:35:43PM +0200, Greg KH wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 07, 2020 at 01:02:39PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > It turns out that with Split-Lock-Detect enabled (default) any VMX
> > > hypervisor needs at least a little modification in order to not blindly
> > > inject the #AC into the guest without the guest being ready for it.
> > >
> > > Since there is no telling which module implements a hypervisor, scan
> > > all out-of-tree modules' text and look for VMX instructions and refuse
> > > to load it when SLD is enabled (default) and the module isn't marked
> > > 'sld_safe'.
> > >
> > > Hypervisors, which have been modified and are known to work correctly,
> > > can add:
> > >
> > > MODULE_INFO(sld_safe, "Y");
> > >
> > > to explicitly tell the module loader they're good.
> >
> > What's to keep any out-of-tree module from adding this same module info
> > "flag" and just lie about it? Isn't that what you are trying to catch
> > here, or is it a case of, "if you lie, your code will break" as well?
>
> If they lie they get to keep both pieces.
>
> The thing I worry about is them lying about "intree", is there anything
> that avoids that?

Yeah, the build system should be enforcing that. I haven't looked in a
while if that really is able to be "faked", but no distro would do that
so it shouldn't be an issue except for custom systems.

greg k-h

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