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SubjectRe: [PATCH v10 00/13] arm64: Branch Target Identification support
On Mon, Mar 23, 2020 at 02:55:46PM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 23, 2020 at 02:39:55PM +0000, Catalin Marinas wrote:

> > So this means that the interpreter will have to mprotect(PROT_BTI) the
> > text section of the primary executable.

> Yes, but after fixing up any relocations in that section it's going to
> have to call mprotect() on it anyhow (e.g. in order to make it
> read-only), and in doing so would throw away BTI unless it was BTI
> aware.

Ah, of course - I forgot that's not a read/modify/write cycle. I'll
send the comment version.

> > That's a valid point. If we have an old dynamic linker and the kernel
> > enabled BTI automatically for the main executable, could things go wrong
> > (e.g. does the PLT need to be BTI-aware)?

> I believe that a PLT in an unguarded page needs no special treatment. A
> PLT within a guarded page needs to be built specially for BTI.

Unguarded stuff is unaffected.
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