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SubjectRe: [RFC PATCH] arch/x86: Optionally flush L1D on context switch
On Sat, 2020-03-21 at 11:05 +0100, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> victim1
> store secrit
> victim2
> attacker read secrit
> Now if L1D is flushed on CPU0 before attacker reaches user space,
> i.e. reaches the attack code, then there is nothing to see. From the
> link:
> Similar to the L1TF VMM mitigations, snoop-assisted L1D sampling can be
> mitigated by flushing the L1D cache between when secrets are accessed
> and when possibly malicious software runs on the same core.
> So the important point is to flush _before_ the attack code runs which
> involves going back to user space or guest mode.

So you mean switching from victim to attacker in the kernel, and going
back to victim before the attacker has a chance to actually execute any
userspace code ?

I can see why this doesn't require a flush, but is it a case worth
optimizing for either ?

IE. The flush in switch_mm is rather trivial, is lower overhead than
adding code to the userspace return code, and avoids kernel threads
likely, I prefer it for its simplicity TBH...


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