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SubjectRe: [PATCH v2] lib/refcount: Document interaction with PID_MAX_LIMIT
On Tue, Mar 03, 2020 at 11:54:27AM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
> Document the circumstances under which refcount_t's saturation mechanism
> works deterministically.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> ---
>
> Notes:
> v2:
> - write down the math (Kees)
>
> include/linux/refcount.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/refcount.h b/include/linux/refcount.h
> index 0ac50cf62d062..0e3ee25eb156a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/refcount.h
> +++ b/include/linux/refcount.h
> @@ -38,11 +38,24 @@
> * atomic operations, then the count will continue to edge closer to 0. If it
> * reaches a value of 1 before /any/ of the threads reset it to the saturated
> * value, then a concurrent refcount_dec_and_test() may erroneously free the
> - * underlying object. Given the precise timing details involved with the
> - * round-robin scheduling of each thread manipulating the refcount and the need
> - * to hit the race multiple times in succession, there doesn't appear to be a
> - * practical avenue of attack even if using refcount_add() operations with
> - * larger increments.
> + * underlying object.
> + * Linux limits the maximum number of tasks to PID_MAX_LIMIT, which is currently
> + * 0x400000 (and can't easily be raised in the future beyond FUTEX_TID_MASK).
> + * With the current PID limit, if no batched refcounting operations are used and
> + * the attacker can't repeatedly trigger kernel oopses in the middle of refcount
> + * operations, this makes it impossible for a saturated refcount to leave the
> + * saturation range, even if it is possible for multiple uses of the same
> + * refcount to nest in the context of a single task:
> + *
> + * (UINT_MAX+1-REFCOUNT_SATURATED) / PID_MAX_LIMIT =
> + * 0x40000000 / 0x400000 = 0x100 = 256
> + *
> + * If hundreds of references are added/removed with a single refcounting
> + * operation, it may potentially be possible to leave the saturation range; but
> + * given the precise timing details involved with the round-robin scheduling of
> + * each thread manipulating the refcount and the need to hit the race multiple
> + * times in succession, there doesn't appear to be a practical avenue of attack
> + * even if using refcount_add() operations with larger increments.
> *
> * Memory ordering
> * ===============
>
> base-commit: 98d54f81e36ba3bf92172791eba5ca5bd813989b

Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Peter -- would you be able to take this through -tip, please?

Will

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