Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH v6 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space | From | Stephen Smalley <> | Date | Thu, 6 Feb 2020 13:23:12 -0500 |
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On 2/5/20 12:30 PM, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > Introduce CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance > monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON would assist > CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for performance monitoring > and observability subsystems. > > CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during performance > monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that > is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access > to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON > capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes > chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure. > Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance > monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e: 2.2.2.39 principle > of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process > or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary > to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such > privileges are actually required) > > CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and > observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted, > multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute > environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to > mass users of a system, and securely unblocks accessibility of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases. > > CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance > monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN > credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1] > for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel > developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system > performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains > open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability > usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations > is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability. > > Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance > of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues > following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs > in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development > process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring > and observability operations. > > [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html > [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html > [3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
This will require a small update to the selinux-testsuite to correctly reflect the new capability requirements, but that's easy enough.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> --- > include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++++ > include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++- > security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- > 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h > index ecce0f43c73a..027d7e4a853b 100644 > --- a/include/linux/capability.h > +++ b/include/linux/capability.h > @@ -251,6 +251,10 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct > extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap); > extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); > extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns); > +static inline bool perfmon_capable(void) > +{ > + return capable(CAP_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); > +} > > /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ > extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps); > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h > index 240fdb9a60f6..8b416e5f3afa 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h > @@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data { > > #define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37 > > +/* > + * Allow system performance and observability privileged operations > + * using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems > + */ > + > +#define CAP_PERFMON 38 > > -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ > +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_PERFMON > > #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP) > > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h > index 7db24855e12d..c599b0c2b0e7 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h > +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h > @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ > "audit_control", "setfcap" > > #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \ > - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read" > + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "perfmon" > > -#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ > +#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_PERFMON > #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS. > #endif > >
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