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    SubjectRe: [RFC][PATCH v2 00/21] x86/pti: Defer CR3 switch to C code
    On Tue, Nov 17, 2020 at 07:12:07PM +0100, Alexandre Chartre wrote:
    > Yes. L1TF/MDS allow some inter cpu-thread attacks which are not mitigated at
    > the moment. In particular, this allows a guest VM to attack another guest VM
    > or the host kernel running on a sibling cpu-thread. Core Scheduling will
    > mitigate the guest-to-guest attack but not the guest-to-host attack.

    I see in vmx_vcpu_enter_exit():

    /* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */
    if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
    vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
    else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
    mds_clear_cpu_buffers();

    Is that not enough?

    --
    Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

    https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

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