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SubjectRe: [PATCH v6 03/10] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
On Tue, 28 Jan 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote:

>
> Open access to monitoring via kprobes and uprobes and eBPF tracing for
> CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON
> capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
> chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure.
>
> perf kprobes and uprobes are used by ftrace and eBPF. perf probe uses
> ftrace to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as
> tracepoint events. eBPF defines new probes via perf_event_open interface
> and then the probes are used in eBPF tracing.
>
> CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance
> monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle
> of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or
> program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to
> accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges
> are actually required)
>
> For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains
> open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for
> secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON
> capability.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)


Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>


--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

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