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SubjectRe: [PATCH] Documentation/admin-guide: Embargoed hardware security issues
On Mon, Aug 05, 2019 at 09:40:21AM -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> I skimmed this and a couple things jumped out at me.
> 1) PGP and S/MIME because of their use of long term keys do not provide
> forward secrecy. Which can makes it worth while to cryptographically
> factor a key or to obtain knowledge of a private key without the key
> holders knowledge. As the keys will be used again and again over a
> long period of time.

Secrecy over a "long period of time" is not what is needed here. 6
months max is what I have seen, why would you need longer?

> More recent protocol's such as Signal's Double Ratchet Protocol
> enable forward secrecy for store and foward communications, and
> remove the problem of long term keys.

And how does that work with email? We need something that actually
works with a tool that everyone can use for development (i.e. email)

> 2) The existence of such a process with encrypted communications to
> ensure long term confidentiality is going to make our contact people
> the targets of people who want access to knolwedge about hardware
> bugs like meltdown, before they become public.

Why are those same people not "targets" today?

And again, it's not long-term.

> I am just mentioning these things in case they are not immediately
> obvious to everyone else involved, so that people can be certain
> they are comfortable with the tradeoffs being made.

I know of no other thing that actually works (and lots of people can't
even get PGP to work as they use foolish email clients.) Do you?


greg k-h

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