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    Subject[PATCH RESEND v11 0/8] openat2(2)
    Date
    This patchset is being developed here:
    <https://github.com/cyphar/linux/tree/resolveat/master>

    Patch changelog:
    v11: [RESEND: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190728010207.9781-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/>]
    * Fix checkpatch.pl errors and warnings where reasonable.
    * Minor cleanup to pr_warn logging for may_open_magiclink().
    * Drop kselftests patch to handle %m formatting correctly, and send
    it through the kselftests tree directly. [Shuah Khan]
    v10: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190719164225.27083-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/>
    v09: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190706145737.5299-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/>
    v08: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190520133305.11925-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/>
    v07: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190507164317.13562-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/>
    v06: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190506165439.9155-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/>
    v05: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190320143717.2523-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/>
    v04: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181112142654.341-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/>
    v03: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181009070230.12884-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/>
    v02: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181009065300.11053-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/>
    v01: <https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20180929103453.12025-1-cyphar@cyphar.com/>

    The need for some sort of control over VFS's path resolution (to avoid
    malicious paths resulting in inadvertent breakouts) has been a very
    long-standing desire of many userspace applications. This patchset is a
    revival of Al Viro's old AT_NO_JUMPS[1,2] patchset (which was a variant
    of David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[3] which was a spin-off of the
    Capsicum project[4]) with a few additions and changes made based on the
    previous discussion within [5] as well as others I felt were useful.

    In line with the conclusions of the original discussion of AT_NO_JUMPS,
    the flag has been split up into separate flags. However, instead of
    being an openat(2) flag it is provided through a new syscall openat2(2)
    which provides several other improvements to the openat(2) interface (see the
    patch description for more details). The following new LOOKUP_* flags are
    added:

    * LOOKUP_NO_XDEV blocks all mountpoint crossings (upwards, downwards,
    or through absolute links). Absolute pathnames alone in openat(2) do
    not trigger this.

    * LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS blocks resolution through /proc/$pid/fd-style
    links. This is done by blocking the usage of nd_jump_link() during
    resolution in a filesystem. The term "magic-links" is used to match
    with the only reference to these links in Documentation/, but I'm
    happy to change the name.

    It should be noted that this is different to the scope of
    ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW in that it applies to all path components. However,
    you can do openat2(NO_FOLLOW|NO_MAGICLINKS) on a magic-link and it
    will *not* fail (assuming that no parent component was a
    magic-link), and you will have an fd for the magic-link.

    * LOOKUP_BENEATH disallows escapes to outside the starting dirfd's
    tree, using techniques such as ".." or absolute links. Absolute
    paths in openat(2) are also disallowed. Conceptually this flag is to
    ensure you "stay below" a certain point in the filesystem tree --
    but this requires some additional to protect against various races
    that would allow escape using "..".

    Currently LOOKUP_BENEATH implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS, because it
    can trivially beam you around the filesystem (breaking the
    protection). In future, there might be similar safety checks done as
    in LOOKUP_IN_ROOT, but that requires more discussion.

    In addition, two new flags are added that expand on the above ideas:

    * LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS does what it says on the tin. No symlink
    resolution is allowed at all, including magic-links. Just as with
    LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS this can still be used with NOFOLLOW to open an
    fd for the symlink as long as no parent path had a symlink
    component.

    * LOOKUP_IN_ROOT is an extension of LOOKUP_BENEATH that, rather than
    blocking attempts to move past the root, forces all such movements
    to be scoped to the starting point. This provides chroot(2)-like
    protection but without the cost of a chroot(2) for each filesystem
    operation, as well as being safe against race attacks that chroot(2)
    is not.

    If a race is detected (as with LOOKUP_BENEATH) then an error is
    generated, and similar to LOOKUP_BENEATH it is not permitted to cross
    magic-links with LOOKUP_IN_ROOT.

    The primary need for this is from container runtimes, which
    currently need to do symlink scoping in userspace[6] when opening
    paths in a potentially malicious container. There is a long list of
    CVEs that could have bene mitigated by having RESOLVE_THIS_ROOT
    (such as CVE-2017-1002101, CVE-2017-1002102, CVE-2018-15664, and
    CVE-2019-5736, just to name a few).

    And further, several semantics of file descriptor "re-opening" are now
    changed to prevent attacks like CVE-2019-5736 by restricting how
    magic-links can be resolved (based on their mode). This required some
    other changes to the semantics of the modes of O_PATH file descriptor's
    associated /proc/self/fd magic-links. openat2(2) has the ability to
    further restrict re-opening of its own O_PATH fds, so that users can
    make even better use of this feature.

    Finally, O_EMPTYPATH was added so that users can do /proc/self/fd-style
    re-opening without depending on procfs. The new restricted semantics for
    magic-links are applied here too.

    In order to make all of the above more usable, I'm working on
    libpathrs[7] which is a C-friendly library for safe path resolution. It
    features a userspace-emulated backend if the kernel doesn't support
    openat2(2). Hopefully we can get userspace to switch to using it, and
    thus get openat2(2) support for free once it's ready.

    Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
    Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
    Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
    Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
    Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
    Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
    Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
    Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
    Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
    Cc: <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>
    Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
    Cc: <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>

    [1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/721443/
    [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/784221/
    [3]: https://lwn.net/Articles/619151/
    [4]: https://lwn.net/Articles/603929/
    [5]: https://lwn.net/Articles/723057/
    [6]: https://github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin
    [7]: https://github.com/openSUSE/libpathrs

    Aleksa Sarai (8):
    namei: obey trailing magic-link DAC permissions
    procfs: switch magic-link modes to be more sane
    open: O_EMPTYPATH: procfs-less file descriptor re-opening
    namei: O_BENEATH-style path resolution flags
    namei: LOOKUP_IN_ROOT: chroot-like path resolution
    namei: aggressively check for nd->root escape on ".." resolution
    open: openat2(2) syscall
    selftests: add openat2(2) selftests

    Documentation/filesystems/path-lookup.rst | 12 +-
    arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h | 1 +
    arch/alpha/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
    arch/arm/tools/syscall.tbl | 1 +
    arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd.h | 2 +-
    arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 2 +
    arch/ia64/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
    arch/m68k/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
    arch/microblaze/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
    arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n32.tbl | 1 +
    arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_n64.tbl | 1 +
    arch/mips/kernel/syscalls/syscall_o32.tbl | 1 +
    arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h | 39 +-
    arch/parisc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
    arch/powerpc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
    arch/s390/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
    arch/sh/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
    arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h | 1 +
    arch/sparc/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
    arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
    arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
    arch/xtensa/kernel/syscalls/syscall.tbl | 1 +
    fs/fcntl.c | 2 +-
    fs/internal.h | 1 +
    fs/namei.c | 270 ++++++++++--
    fs/open.c | 112 ++++-
    fs/proc/base.c | 20 +-
    fs/proc/fd.c | 23 +-
    fs/proc/namespaces.c | 2 +-
    include/linux/fcntl.h | 17 +-
    include/linux/fs.h | 8 +-
    include/linux/namei.h | 9 +
    include/linux/syscalls.h | 17 +-
    include/uapi/asm-generic/fcntl.h | 4 +
    include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 5 +-
    include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h | 42 ++
    tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 +
    tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 7 +-
    tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore | 1 +
    tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile | 8 +
    tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c | 162 +++++++
    tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h | 116 +++++
    .../testing/selftests/openat2/linkmode_test.c | 333 +++++++++++++++
    .../selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c | 127 ++++++
    .../testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c | 402 ++++++++++++++++++
    45 files changed, 1655 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-)
    create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/.gitignore
    create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile
    create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.c
    create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h
    create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/linkmode_test.c
    create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/rename_attack_test.c
    create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/resolve_test.c

    --
    2.22.0

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