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SubjectRe: [PATCH] erofs: move erofs out of staging
On Sun, Aug 18, 2019 at 08:58:12AM -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Sun, Aug 18, 2019 at 11:11:54AM -0400, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
> > Note that of the mainstream file systems, ext4 and xfs don't guarantee
> > that it's safe to blindly take maliciously provided file systems, such
> > as those provided by a untrusted container, and mount it on a file
> > system without problems. As I recall, one of the XFS developers
> > described file system fuzzing reports as a denial of service attack on
> > the developers.
>
> I think this greatly misrepresents the general attitute of the XFS
> developers. We take sanity checks for the modern v5 on disk format
> very series, and put a lot of effort into handling corrupted file
> systems as good as possible, although there are of course no guaranteeѕ.
>
> The quote that you've taken out of context is for the legacy v4 format
> that has no checksums and other integrity features.

Ted's observation was about maliciously-crafted filesystems, though, so
integrity-only features such as metadata checksums are irrelevant. Also the
filesystem version is irrelevant; anything accepted by the kernel code (even if
it's legacy/deprecated) is open attack surface.

I personally consider it *mandatory* that we deal with this stuff. But I can
understand that we don't do a good job at it, so we shouldn't hold a new
filesystem to an unfairly high standard relative to other filesystems...

- Eric

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