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SubjectRe: general protection fault in tls_write_space
Hillf Danton wrote:
>
> On Sat, 10 Aug 2019 01:23:06 -0700
> >
> > syzbot has found a reproducer for the following crash on:
> >
> > HEAD commit: ca497fb6 taprio: remove unused variable 'entry_list_policy'
> > git tree: net-next
> > console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=109f3802600000
> > kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=d4cf1ffb87d590d7
> > dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=dcdc9deefaec44785f32
> > compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental)
> > syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=11c78cd2600000
> >
> > IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
> > Reported-by: syzbot+dcdc9deefaec44785f32@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
> >
> > kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
> > kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
> > general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
> > CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: ksoftirqd/0 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc3+ #125
> > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
> > Google 01/01/2011
> > RIP: 0010:tls_write_space+0x51/0x170 net/tls/tls_main.c:239
> > Code: c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 26 01 00 00 49 8b 9c 24 b0 06 00 00 48 b8
> > 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 7b 6a 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 48
> > 89 fa 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 df 00 00 00
> > RSP: 0018:ffff8880a98b74c8 EFLAGS: 00010202
> > RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff860a27a2
> > RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: ffffffff862c86c1 RDI: 000000000000006a
> > RBP: ffff8880a98b74e0 R08: ffff8880a98a2240 R09: fffffbfff167c289
> > R10: fffffbfff167c288 R11: ffffffff8b3e1447 R12: ffff8880a4de41c0
> > R13: ffff8880a4de45b8 R14: 000000000000000a R15: 0000000000000000
> > FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> > CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> > CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000008c9d1000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
> > DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
> > DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
> > Call Trace:
> > tcp_new_space net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5151 [inline]
> > tcp_check_space+0x191/0x760 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5162
> > tcp_data_snd_check net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5172 [inline]
> > tcp_rcv_state_process+0xe24/0x4e48 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6303
> > tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x7d7/0x12c0 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1381
> > tcp_v6_rcv+0x31f1/0x3500 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1588
> > ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2fe/0x1660 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:397
> > ip6_input_finish+0x84/0x170 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438
> > NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline]
> > NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:299 [inline]
> > ip6_input+0xe4/0x3f0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:447
> > dst_input include/net/dst.h:442 [inline]
> > ip6_rcv_finish+0x1de/0x2f0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:76
> > NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:305 [inline]
> > NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:299 [inline]
> > ipv6_rcv+0x10e/0x420 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:272
> > __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x113/0x1a0 net/core/dev.c:5006
> > __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1d0 net/core/dev.c:5120
> > process_backlog+0x206/0x750 net/core/dev.c:5951
> > napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6388 [inline]
> > net_rx_action+0x4d6/0x1080 net/core/dev.c:6456
> > __do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292
> > run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:603 [inline]
> > run_ksoftirqd+0x8e/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:595
> > smpboot_thread_fn+0x6a3/0xa40 kernel/smpboot.c:165
> > kthread+0x361/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:255
> > ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
> > Modules linked in:
> > ---[ end trace c21a83505707bb9d ]---
>
> Followup of commit 95fa145479fb
> ("bpf: sockmap/tls, close can race with map free")
>
> --- a/net/tls/tls_main.c
> +++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c
> @@ -308,6 +308,9 @@ static void tls_sk_proto_close(struct so
> if (free_ctx)
> icsk->icsk_ulp_data = NULL;
> sk->sk_prot = ctx->sk_proto;
> + /* tls will go; restore sock callback before enabling bh */
> + if (sk->sk_write_space == tls_write_space)
> + sk->sk_write_space = ctx->sk_write_space;
> write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
> release_sock(sk);
> if (ctx->tx_conf == TLS_SW)

Hi Hillf,

We need this patch (although slightly updated for bpf tree) do
you want to send it? Otherwise I can. We should only set this if
TX path was enabled otherwise we null it. Checking against
tls_write_space seems best to me as well.

Against bpf this patch should fix it.

diff --git a/net/tls/tls_main.c b/net/tls/tls_main.c
index ce6ef56a65ef..43252a801c3f 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_main.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c
@@ -308,7 +308,8 @@ static void tls_sk_proto_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
if (free_ctx)
icsk->icsk_ulp_data = NULL;
sk->sk_prot = ctx->sk_proto;
- sk->sk_write_space = ctx->sk_write_space;
+ if (sk->sk_write_space == tls_write_space)
+ sk->sk_write_space = ctx->sk_write_space;
write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
release_sock(sk);
if (ctx->tx_conf == TLS_SW)
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