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SubjectRe: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or deactivated
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On Fri, 2019-07-05 at 18:37 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> Commit c78719203fc6 ("KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize
> w/o a
> TPM") allows the trusted module to be loaded even a TPM is not found
> to
> avoid module dependency problems.
>
> Unfortunately, this does not completely solve the issue, as there
> could be
> a case where a TPM is found but is not functional (the TPM commands
> return
> an error). Specifically, after the tpm_chip structure is returned by
> tpm_default_chip() in init_trusted(), the execution terminates after
> init_digests() returns -EFAULT (due to the fact that tpm_get_random()
> returns a positive value, but less than TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE).
>
> This patch fixes the issue by ignoring the TPM_ERR_DEACTIVATED and
> TPM_ERR_DISABLED errors.
>
> Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip
> structure...")
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> ---
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 2 --
> include/linux/tpm.h | 3 +++
> security/keys/trusted.c | 6 +++++-
> 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> index e503ffc3aa39..a216ac396711 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> @@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ enum tpm_addr {
>
> #define TPM_WARN_RETRY 0x800
> #define TPM_WARN_DOING_SELFTEST 0x802
> -#define TPM_ERR_DEACTIVATED 0x6
> -#define TPM_ERR_DISABLED 0x7
> #define TPM_ERR_INVALID_POSTINIT 38
>
> #define TPM_HEADER_SIZE 10
> diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
> index 53c0ea9ec9df..efd3ccbb6aee 100644
> --- a/include/linux/tpm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
> @@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
> #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */
> #define TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
>
> +#define TPM_ERR_DEACTIVATED 0x6
> +#define TPM_ERR_DISABLED 0x7
> +
> struct tpm_chip;
> struct trusted_key_payload;
> struct trusted_key_options;
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
> index 9a94672e7adc..430d85090b3b 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
> @@ -389,6 +389,10 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
> if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
>
> + /* This can happen if the TPM is inactive. */
> + if (!digests)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> return tpm_pcr_extend(chip, pcrnum, digests) ? -EINVAL : 0;
> }
>
> @@ -1233,7 +1237,7 @@ static int __init init_digests(void)
> int i;
>
> ret = tpm_get_random(chip, digest, TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);

Not a criticism of your patch, but can we please stop doing this.
Single random number sources are horrendously bad practice because it
gives an attacker a single target to subvert. We should ensure the TPM
is plugged into the kernel RNG as a source and then take randomness
from the mixed pool so it's harder for an attacker because they have to
subvert all our sources to predict what came out.

James

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