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Subject[PATCH v9 05/10] namei: O_BENEATH-style path resolution flags
Date
Add the following flags to allow various restrictions on path
resolution (these affect the *entire* resolution, rather than just the
final path component -- as is the case with most other AT_* flags).

The primary justification for these flags is to allow for programs to be
far more strict about how they want path resolution to handle symlinks,
mountpoint crossings, and paths that escape the dirfd (through an
absolute path or ".." shenanigans).

This is of particular concern to container runtimes that want to be very
careful about malicious root filesystems that a container's init might
have screwed around with (and there is no real way to protect against
this in userspace if you consider potential races against a malicious
container's init). More classical applications (which have their own
potentially buggy userspace path sanitisation code) include web
servers, archive extraction tools, network file servers, and so on.

These flags are exposed to userspace in a later patchset.

* LOOKUP_XDEV: Disallow mount-point crossing (both *down* into one, or
*up* from one). The primary "scoping" use is to blocking resolution
that crosses a bind-mount, which has a similar property to a symlink
(in the way that it allows for escape from the starting-point). Since
it is not possible to differentiate bind-mounts However since
bind-mounting requires privileges (in ways symlinks don't) this has
been split from LOOKUP_BENEATH. The naming is based on "find -xdev" as
well as -EXDEV (though find(1) doesn't walk upwards, the semantics
seem obvious).

* LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS: Disallows ->get_link "symlink" jumping. This is
a very specific restriction, and it exists because /proc/$pid/fd/...
"symlinks" allow for access outside nd->root and pose risk to
container runtimes that don't want to be tricked into accessing a host
path (but do want to allow no-funny-business symlink resolution).

* LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS: Disallows symlink jumping *of any kind*. Implies
LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS (obviously).

* LOOKUP_BENEATH: Disallow "escapes" from the starting point of the
filesystem tree during resolution (you must stay "beneath" the
starting point at all times). Currently this is done by disallowing
".." and absolute paths (either in the given path or found during
symlink resolution) entirely, as well as all magic-link jumping.

The wholesale banning of ".." is because it is currently not safe to
allow ".." resolution (races can cause the path to be moved outside of
the root -- this is conceptually similar to historical chroot(2)
escape attacks). Future patches in this series will address this, and
will re-enable ".." resolution once it is safe. With those patches,
".." resolution will only be allowed if it remains in the root
throughout resolution (such as "a/../b" not "a/../../outside/b").

The banning of magic-link jumping is done because it is not clear
whether semantically they should be allowed -- while some magic-links
are safe there are many that can cause escapes (and once a
resolution is outside of the root, O_BENEATH will no longer detect
it). Future patches may re-enable magic-link jumping when such jumps
would remain inside the root.

The LOOKUP_NO_*LINK flags return -ELOOP if path resolution would
violates their requirement, while the others all return -EXDEV.

This is a refresh of Al's AT_NO_JUMPS patchset[1] (which was a variation
on David Drysdale's O_BENEATH patchset[2], which in turn was based on
the Capsicum project[3]). Input from Linus and Andy in the AT_NO_JUMPS
thread[4] determined most of the API changes made in this refresh.

[1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/721443/
[2]: https://lwn.net/Articles/619151/
[3]: https://lwn.net/Articles/603929/
[4]: https://lwn.net/Articles/723057/

Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Suggested-by: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
---
fs/namei.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
include/linux/namei.h | 7 ++++
2 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index b490bcf855f8..9c3ed597466b 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -852,6 +852,13 @@ static inline void path_to_nameidata(const struct path *path,

static int nd_jump_root(struct nameidata *nd)
{
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH))
+ return -EXDEV;
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_XDEV)) {
+ /* Absolute path arguments to path_init() are allowed. */
+ if (nd->path.mnt != NULL && nd->path.mnt != nd->root.mnt)
+ return -EXDEV;
+ }
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
struct dentry *d;
nd->path = nd->root;
@@ -1104,6 +1111,9 @@ const char *get_link(struct nameidata *nd, bool trailing)
int error;
const char *res;

+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS))
+ return ERR_PTR(-ELOOP);
+
if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)) {
touch_atime(&last->link);
cond_resched();
@@ -1136,6 +1146,11 @@ const char *get_link(struct nameidata *nd, bool trailing)
}
/* If we just jumped it was because of a magic-link. */
if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_JUMPED)) {
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS))
+ return ERR_PTR(-ELOOP);
+ /* Not currently safe. */
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EXDEV);
/*
* For trailing_symlink we check whether the symlink's
* mode allows us to do what we want through acc_mode.
@@ -1178,8 +1193,9 @@ const char *get_link(struct nameidata *nd, bool trailing)
if (*res == '/') {
if (!nd->root.mnt)
set_root(nd);
- if (unlikely(nd_jump_root(nd)))
- return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+ error = nd_jump_root(nd);
+ if (unlikely(error))
+ return ERR_PTR(error);
while (unlikely(*++res == '/'))
;
}
@@ -1360,12 +1376,16 @@ static int follow_managed(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd)
break;
}

- if (need_mntput && path->mnt == mnt)
- mntput(path->mnt);
+ if (need_mntput) {
+ if (path->mnt == mnt)
+ mntput(path->mnt);
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_XDEV))
+ ret = -EXDEV;
+ else
+ nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
+ }
if (ret == -EISDIR || !ret)
ret = 1;
- if (need_mntput)
- nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
path_put_conditional(path, nd);
return ret;
@@ -1422,6 +1442,8 @@ static bool __follow_mount_rcu(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path,
mounted = __lookup_mnt(path->mnt, path->dentry);
if (!mounted)
break;
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_XDEV))
+ return false;
path->mnt = &mounted->mnt;
path->dentry = mounted->mnt.mnt_root;
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
@@ -1442,8 +1464,11 @@ static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
struct inode *inode = nd->inode;

while (1) {
- if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root))
+ if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root)) {
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH))
+ return -EXDEV;
break;
+ }
if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
struct dentry *old = nd->path.dentry;
struct dentry *parent = old->d_parent;
@@ -1468,6 +1493,8 @@ static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
return -ECHILD;
if (&mparent->mnt == nd->path.mnt)
break;
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_XDEV))
+ return -EXDEV;
/* we know that mountpoint was pinned */
nd->path.dentry = mountpoint;
nd->path.mnt = &mparent->mnt;
@@ -1482,6 +1509,8 @@ static int follow_dotdot_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
return -ECHILD;
if (!mounted)
break;
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_XDEV))
+ return -EXDEV;
nd->path.mnt = &mounted->mnt;
nd->path.dentry = mounted->mnt.mnt_root;
inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
@@ -1570,8 +1599,11 @@ static int path_parent_directory(struct path *path)
static int follow_dotdot(struct nameidata *nd)
{
while(1) {
- if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root))
+ if (path_equal(&nd->path, &nd->root)) {
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH))
+ return -EXDEV;
break;
+ }
if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
int ret = path_parent_directory(&nd->path);
if (ret)
@@ -1580,6 +1612,8 @@ static int follow_dotdot(struct nameidata *nd)
}
if (!follow_up(&nd->path))
break;
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_XDEV))
+ return -EXDEV;
}
follow_mount(&nd->path);
nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
@@ -1794,6 +1828,13 @@ static inline int may_lookup(struct nameidata *nd)
static inline int handle_dots(struct nameidata *nd, int type)
{
if (type == LAST_DOTDOT) {
+ /*
+ * LOOKUP_BENEATH resolving ".." is not currently safe -- races can
+ * cause our parent to have moved outside of the root and us to skip
+ * over it.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH))
+ return -EXDEV;
if (!nd->root.mnt)
set_root(nd);
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
@@ -2342,6 +2383,15 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
nd->path.dentry = NULL;

nd->m_seq = read_seqbegin(&mount_lock);
+
+ if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH)) {
+ error = dirfd_path_init(nd);
+ if (unlikely(error))
+ return ERR_PTR(error);
+ nd->root = nd->path;
+ if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU))
+ path_get(&nd->root);
+ }
if (*s == '/') {
if (likely(!nd->root.mnt))
set_root(nd);
@@ -2350,9 +2400,11 @@ static const char *path_init(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags)
s = ERR_PTR(error);
return s;
}
- error = dirfd_path_init(nd);
- if (unlikely(error))
- return ERR_PTR(error);
+ if (likely(!nd->path.mnt)) {
+ error = dirfd_path_init(nd);
+ if (unlikely(error))
+ return ERR_PTR(error);
+ }
return s;
}

diff --git a/include/linux/namei.h b/include/linux/namei.h
index 9138b4471dbf..7bc819ad0cd3 100644
--- a/include/linux/namei.h
+++ b/include/linux/namei.h
@@ -50,6 +50,13 @@ enum {LAST_NORM, LAST_ROOT, LAST_DOT, LAST_DOTDOT, LAST_BIND};
#define LOOKUP_EMPTY 0x4000
#define LOOKUP_DOWN 0x8000

+/* Scoping flags for lookup. */
+#define LOOKUP_BENEATH 0x010000 /* No escaping from starting point. */
+#define LOOKUP_XDEV 0x020000 /* No mountpoint crossing. */
+#define LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS 0x040000 /* No /proc/$pid/fd/ "symlink" crossing. */
+#define LOOKUP_NO_SYMLINKS 0x080000 /* No symlink crossing *at all*.
+ Implies LOOKUP_NO_MAGICLINKS. */
+
extern int path_pts(struct path *path);

extern int user_path_at_empty(int, const char __user *, unsigned, struct path *, int *empty);
--
2.22.0
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