Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 10 Jul 2019 17:05:19 -0700 (PDT) | From | Paul Walmsley <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] RISC-V: Setup initial page tables in two stages |
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On Fri, 7 Jun 2019, Anup Patel wrote:
> Currently, the setup_vm() does initial page table setup in one-shot > very early before enabling MMU. Due to this, the setup_vm() has to map > all possible kernel virtual addresses since it does not know size and > location of RAM. This means we have kernel mappings for non-existent > RAM and any buggy driver (or kernel) code doing out-of-bound access > to RAM will not fault and cause underterministic behaviour. > > Further, the setup_vm() creates PMD mappings (i.e. 2M mappings) for > RV64 systems. This means for PAGE_OFFSET=0xffffffe000000000 (i.e. > MAXPHYSMEM_128GB=y), the setup_vm() will require 129 pages (i.e. > 516 KB) of memory for initial page tables which is never freed. The > memory required for initial page tables will further increase if > we chose a lower value of PAGE_OFFSET (e.g. 0xffffff0000000000) > > This patch implements two-staged initial page table setup, as follows: > 1. Early (i.e. setup_vm()): This stage maps kernel image and DTB in > a early page table (i.e. early_pg_dir). The early_pg_dir will be used > only by boot HART so it can be freed as-part of init memory free-up. > 2. Final (i.e. setup_vm_final()): This stage maps all possible RAM > banks in the final page table (i.e. swapper_pg_dir). The boot HART > will start using swapper_pg_dir at the end of setup_vm_final(). All > non-boot HARTs directly use the swapper_pg_dir created by boot HART. > > We have following advantages with this new approach: > 1. Kernel mappings for non-existent RAM don't exists anymore. > 2. Memory consumed by initial page tables is now indpendent of the > chosen PAGE_OFFSET. > 3. Memory consumed by initial page tables on RV64 system is 2 pages > (i.e. 8 KB) which has significantly reduced and these pages will be > freed as-part of the init memory free-up. > > The patch also provides a foundation for implementing strict kernel > mappings where we protect kernel text and rodata using PTE permissions. > > Suggested-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> > Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup.patel@wdc.com>
Thanks, updated to apply and to fix a checkpatch warning, and queued.
This may not make it in for v5.3-rc1; if not, we'll submit it later.
- Paul
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