Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: add enforce-evm and log-evm modes to strictly check EVM status | From | Roberto Sassu <> | Date | Fri, 7 Jun 2019 17:14:07 +0200 |
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On 6/7/2019 5:08 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > On Fri, 2019-06-07 at 16:40 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote: >>> On Thu, 2019-06-06 at 13:26 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote: > >>>> Although this choice appears legitimate, it might not be suitable for >>>> hardened systems, where the administrator expects that access is denied if >>>> there is any error. An attacker could intentionally delete the EVM keys >>>> from the system and set the file digest in security.ima to the actual file >>>> digest so that the final appraisal status is INTEGRITY_PASS. >>> >>> Assuming that the EVM HMAC key is stored in the initramfs, not on some >>> other file system, and the initramfs is signed, INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN >>> would be limited to the rootfs filesystem. >> >> There is another issue. The HMAC key, like the public keys, should be >> loaded when appraisal is disabled. This means that we have to create a >> trusted key at early boot and defer the unsealing. > > There is no need for IMA to appraise the public key file signature, > since the certificate is signed by a key on the builtin/secondary > trusted keyring. With CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 enabled, the public key > can be loaded onto the IMA keyring with IMA-appraisal enabled, but > without verifying the file signature.
Yes, but access to the files containing the master key and the EVM key is denied if appraisal is enabled.
Roberto
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