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SubjectRe: [PATCH V34 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 1:09 PM Andy Lutomirski <> wrote:

> I'm confused. I understand why we're restricting bpf_probe_read().
> Why are we restricting bpf_probe_write_user() and bpf_trace_printk(),
> though?

Hmm. I think the thinking here was around exfiltration mechanisms, but
if the read is blocked then that seems less likely. This seems to
trace back to
- Joey, do you know the reasoning here?

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