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Subject[PATCH V34 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
From
Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels.
For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating
a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those
platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to
determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type,
and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down.
This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set
in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
---
include/linux/ima.h | 9 ++++++
kernel/kexec_file.c | 11 +++++--
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index dc12fbcf484c..c30954acc660 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -132,4 +132,13 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
+extern bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func);
+#else
+static inline bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
#endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index 27adb4312b03..539d0ca855bc 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -237,8 +237,15 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
goto out;
}

- ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC);
- if (ret)
+ ret = 0;
+
+ /* If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec
+ * image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked
+ * down.
+ */
+ if (!ima_appraise_signature(READING_KEXEC_IMAGE) &&
+ security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC)) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
goto out;

break;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d213e835c498..3bc62062cfe8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr {
u64 count;
};

+extern const int read_idmap[];
+
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void);
#else
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 357edd140c09..927fe889201a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
return 0;
}

-static const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
+const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
[READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
[READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
[READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e0cc323f948f..8784449918e2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -1339,3 +1339,53 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
+/*
+ * ima_appraise_signature: whether IMA will appraise a given function using
+ * an IMA digital signature. This is restricted to cases where the kernel
+ * has a set of built-in trusted keys in order to avoid an attacker simply
+ * loading additional keys.
+ */
+bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+ struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+ bool found = false;
+ enum ima_hooks func;
+
+ if (id >= READING_MAX_ID)
+ return false;
+
+ func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
+ if (entry->action != APPRAISE)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * A generic entry will match, but otherwise require that it
+ * match the func we're looking for
+ */
+ if (entry->func && entry->func != func)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * We require this to be a digital signature, not a raw IMA
+ * hash.
+ */
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)
+ found = true;
+
+ /*
+ * We've found a rule that matches, so break now even if it
+ * didn't require a digital signature - a later rule that does
+ * won't override it, so would be a false positive.
+ */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return found;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
--
2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog
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