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SubjectRe: [PATCH 5/5 v4] removed the LSM hook made available, and renamed the ima_policy to be KEXEC_CMDLINE
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On Fri, 2019-05-03 at 15:25 -0700, Prakhar Srivastava wrote:
> From: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
>
> Per suggestions from the community, removed the LSM hook.
> and renamed the buffer_check func and policy to kexec_cmdline
> [suggested by: Mimi Zohar]

To improve readability of the patches, please fold this patch into the
other patches appropriately.

Mimi


> Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
> ---
> Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +-
> include/linux/ima.h | 6 +--
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 --
> include/linux/security.h | 1 -
> kernel/kexec_core.c | 59 +---------------------------
> kernel/kexec_file.c | 14 +------
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 11 +++---
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 +-
> security/security.c | 6 ---
> 11 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 95 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> index 12cfe3ff2dea..62e7cd687e9c 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Description:
> base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
> [FIRMWARE_CHECK]
> [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK]
> - [BUFFER_CHECK]
> + [KEXEC_CMDLINE]
> mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
> [[^]MAY_EXEC]
> fsmagic:= hex value
> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
> index f0abade74707..2c7a22231008 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ima.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h
> @@ -26,8 +26,7 @@ extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
> -extern void ima_buffer_check(const void *buff, int size,
> - const char *eventname);
> +extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buff, int size);
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
> extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
> @@ -94,8 +93,7 @@ static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
> return;
> }
>
> -static inline void ima_buffer_check(const void *buff, int size,
> - const char *eventname)
> +static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buff, int size)
> {}
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index f18562c1eb24..a240a3fc5fc4 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1672,8 +1672,6 @@ union security_list_options {
> int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
>
> - int (*buffer_check)(const void *buff, int size, const char *eventname);
> -
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> int (*unix_stream_connect)(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
> struct sock *newsk);
> @@ -1947,7 +1945,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
> struct hlist_head inode_notifysecctx;
> struct hlist_head inode_setsecctx;
> struct hlist_head inode_getsecctx;
> - struct hlist_head buffer_check;
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> struct hlist_head unix_stream_connect;
> struct hlist_head unix_may_send;
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 8dece6da0dda..8a129664ba4e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -388,7 +388,6 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
> int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
> -void security_buffer_measure(const void *buff, int size, char *eventname);
> #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>
> static inline int call_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c
> index 4667f03d406e..8c0a83980d72 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec_core.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c
> @@ -1212,61 +1212,4 @@ void __weak arch_kexec_protect_crashkres(void)
> {}
>
> void __weak arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void)
> -{}
> -
> -/**
> - * kexec_cmdline_prepend_img_name - prepare the buffer with cmdline
> - * that needs to be measured
> - * @outbuf - out buffer that contains the formated string
> - * @kernel_fd - the file identifier for the kerenel image
> - * @cmdline_ptr - ptr to the cmdline buffer
> - * @cmdline_len - len of the buffer.
> - *
> - * This generates a buffer in the format Kerenelfilename::cmdline
> - *
> - * On success return 0.
> - * On failure return -EINVAL.
> - */
> -int kexec_cmdline_prepend_img_name(char **outbuf, int kernel_fd,
> - const char *cmdline_ptr,
> - unsigned long cmdline_len)
> -{
> - int ret = -EINVAL;
> - struct fd f = {};
> - int size = 0;
> - char *buf = NULL;
> - char delimiter[] = "::";
> -
> - if (!outbuf || !cmdline_ptr)
> - goto out;
> -
> - f = fdget(kernel_fd);
> - if (!f.file)
> - goto out;
> -
> - size = (f.file->f_path.dentry->d_name.len + cmdline_len - 1+
> - ARRAY_SIZE(delimiter)) - 1;
> -
> - buf = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!buf)
> - goto out;
> -
> - memcpy(buf, f.file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name,
> - f.file->f_path.dentry->d_name.len);
> - memcpy(buf + f.file->f_path.dentry->d_name.len,
> - delimiter, ARRAY_SIZE(delimiter) - 1);
> - memcpy(buf + f.file->f_path.dentry->d_name.len +
> - ARRAY_SIZE(delimiter) - 1,
> - cmdline_ptr, cmdline_len - 1);
> -
> - *outbuf = buf;
> - ret = size;
> -
> - pr_debug("kexec cmdline buff: %s\n", buf);
> -
> -out:
> - if (f.file)
> - fdput(f);
> -
> - return ret;
> -}
> +{}
> \ No newline at end of file
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> index d287e139085c..2eb977984537 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> @@ -191,8 +191,6 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
> int ret = 0;
> void *ldata;
> loff_t size;
> - char *buff_to_measure = NULL;
> - int buff_to_measure_size = 0;
>
> ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf,
> &size, INT_MAX, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
> @@ -244,15 +242,8 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
> goto out;
> }
>
> - /* IMA measures the cmdline args passed to the next kernel*/
> - buff_to_measure_size =
> - kexec_cmdline_prepend_img_name(&buff_to_measure,
> - kernel_fd, image->cmdline_buf, image->cmdline_buf_len);
> -
> - ima_buffer_check(buff_to_measure, buff_to_measure_size,
> - "kexec_cmdline");
> -
> -
> + /* IMA measures the cmdline args passed to the next kernel */
> + ima_kexec_cmdline(image->cmdline_buf, image->cmdline_buf_len - 1);
> }
>
> /* Call arch image load handlers */
> @@ -267,7 +258,6 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
> out:
>
> /* In case of error, free up all allocated memory in this function */
> - kfree(buff_to_measure);
> if (ret)
> kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(image);
> return ret;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index de70df132575..226a26d8de09 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
> hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) \
> hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK) \
> hook(POLICY_CHECK) \
> - hook(BUFFER_CHECK) \
> + hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE) \
> hook(MAX_CHECK)
> #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM) ENUM,
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> index cb3f67b366f1..800d965232e5 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
> * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
> * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
> * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
> - * | BUFFER_CHECK
> + * | KEXEC_CMDLINE
> * mask: contains the permission mask
> * fsmagic: hex value
> *
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 7362952ab273..fc9cef54e37c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ static int process_buffer_measurement(const void *buff, int size,
> if (!buff || size == 0 || !eventname)
> goto err_out;
>
> - action = ima_get_action(NULL, cred, secid, 0, BUFFER_CHECK, &pcr);
> + action = ima_get_action(NULL, cred, secid, 0, KEXEC_CMDLINE, &pcr);
> if (!(action & IMA_AUDIT) && !(action & IMA_MEASURE))
> goto err_out;
>
> @@ -672,21 +672,20 @@ static int process_buffer_measurement(const void *buff, int size,
> }
>
> /**
> - * ima_buffer_check - based on policy, collect & store buffer measurement
> + * ima_kexec_cmdline - based on policy, collect & store buffer measurement
> * @buf: pointer to buffer
> * @size: size of buffer
> - * @eventname: event name identifier
> *
> * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised. The buffer identifier
> * is used as the measurement list entry name (eg. boot_cmdline).
> */
> -void ima_buffer_check(const void *buf, int size, const char *eventname)
> +void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size)
> {
> u32 secid;
>
> - if (buf && size != 0 && eventname) {
> + if (buf && size != 0) {
> security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
> - process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, eventname,
> + process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "Kexec-cmdline",
> current_cred(), secid);
> }
> }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index b12551ed191c..7ae59afbf28f 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -875,8 +875,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> entry->func = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK;
> else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0)
> entry->func = POLICY_CHECK;
> - else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BUFFER_CHECK") == 0)
> - entry->func = BUFFER_CHECK;
> + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_CMDLINE") == 0)
> + entry->func = KEXEC_CMDLINE;
> else
> result = -EINVAL;
> if (!result)
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 2b575a40470e..23cbb1a295a3 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -754,12 +754,6 @@ int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
> }
>
> -void security_buffer_measure(const void *buff, int size, char *eventname)
> -{
> - call_void_hook(buffer_check, buff, size, eventname);
> - return ima_buffer_check(buff, size, eventname);
> -}
> -
> void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> {
> call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm);

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