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SubjectRe: [PATCH v2 1/3] evm: check hash algorithm passed to init_desc()
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On Wed, 2019-05-29 at 15:30 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> This patch prevents memory access beyond the evm_tfm array by checking the
> validity of the index (hash algorithm) passed to init_desc(). The hash
> algorithm can be arbitrarily set if the security.ima xattr type is not
> EVM_XATTR_HMAC.
>
> Fixes: 5feeb61183dde ("evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures")
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Thanks, queued.

> ---
> security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> index e11564eb645b..82a38e801ee4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> @@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
> tfm = &hmac_tfm;
> algo = evm_hmac;
> } else {
> + if (hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> +
> tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo];
> algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo];
> }

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