Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 24 May 2019 10:07:04 -0700 | From | Sean Christopherson <> | Subject | Re: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support) |
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On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 09:43:27AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 12:24 AM Xing, Cedric <cedric.xing@intel.com> wrote: > > /** > > * Summary: > > * - The enclave file resembles a shared object that contains RO/RX/RW segments > > * - FILE__* are assigned to /dev/sgx/enclave, to determine acceptable permissions to mmap()/mprotect(), valid combinations are > > * + FILE__READ - Allow SGX1 enclaves only > > * + FILE__READ|FILE__WRITE - Allow SGX2 enclaves to expand data segments (e.g. heaps, stacks, etc.) > > I think this is a non-starter :( FILE__WRITE also means that you can > write to the file, and the admin / policy author will almost never > want to allow that.
Why would FILE__WRITE on /dev/sgx/enclave be a problem? An actual write to /dev/sgx/enclave would yield -EINVAL, no?
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