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SubjectRe: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 09:43:27AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 12:24 AM Xing, Cedric <cedric.xing@intel.com> wrote:
> > /**
> > * Summary:
> > * - The enclave file resembles a shared object that contains RO/RX/RW segments
> > * - FILE__* are assigned to /dev/sgx/enclave, to determine acceptable permissions to mmap()/mprotect(), valid combinations are
> > * + FILE__READ - Allow SGX1 enclaves only
> > * + FILE__READ|FILE__WRITE - Allow SGX2 enclaves to expand data segments (e.g. heaps, stacks, etc.)
>
> I think this is a non-starter :( FILE__WRITE also means that you can
> write to the file, and the admin / policy author will almost never
> want to allow that.

Why would FILE__WRITE on /dev/sgx/enclave be a problem? An actual
write to /dev/sgx/enclave would yield -EINVAL, no?

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