[lkml]   [2019]   [May]   [17]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
SubjectRe: SGX vs LSM (Re: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support)
On 5/17/19 2:05 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 5/17/19 1:12 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On May 17, 2019, at 9:37 AM, Stephen Smalley <> wrote:
>>>> On 5/17/19 12:20 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>>>> On 5/17/19 11:09 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>>>>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 09:53:06AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>>>>>> On 5/16/19 6:23 PM, Xing, Cedric wrote:
>>>>>>> I thought EXECMOD applied to files (and memory mappings backed by
>>>>>>> them) but
>>>>>>> I was probably wrong. It sounds like EXECMOD applies to the whole
>>>>>>> process so
>>>>>>> would allow all pages within a process's address space to be
>>>>>>> modified then
>>>>>>> executed, regardless the backing files. Am I correct this time?
>>>>>> No, you were correct the first time I think; EXECMOD is used to
>>>>>> control
>>>>>> whether a process can make executable a private file mapping that has
>>>>>> previously been modified (e.g. text relocation); it is a special
>>>>>> case to
>>>>>> support text relocations without having to allow full EXECMEM
>>>>>> (i.e. execute
>>>>>> arbitrary memory).
>>>>>> SELinux checks relevant to W^X include:
>>>>>> - EXECMEM: mmap/mprotect PROT_EXEC an anonymous mapping
>>>>>> (regardless of
>>>>>> PROT_WRITE, since we know the content has to have been written at
>>>>>> some
>>>>>> point) or a private file mapping that is also PROT_WRITE.
>>>>>> - EXECMOD: mprotect PROT_EXEC a private file mapping that has been
>>>>>> previously modified, typically for text relocations,
>>>>>> - FILE__WRITE: mmap/mprotect PROT_WRITE a shared file mapping,
>>>>>> - FILE__EXECUTE: mmap/mprotect PROT_EXEC a file mapping.
>>>>>> (ignoring EXECSTACK and EXECHEAP here since they aren't really
>>>>>> relevant to
>>>>>> this discussion)
>>>>>> So if you want to ensure W^X, then you wouldn't allow EXECMEM for the
>>>>>> process, EXECMOD by the process to any file, and the combination
>>>>>> of both
>>>>>> FILE__WRITE and FILE__EXECUTE by the process to any file.
>>>>>> If the /dev/sgx/enclave mappings are MAP_SHARED and you aren't
>>>>>> using an
>>>>>> anonymous inode, then I would expect that only the FILE__WRITE and
>>>>>> FILE__EXECUTE checks are relevant.
>>>>> Yep, I was just typing this up in a different thread:
>>>>> I think we may want to change the SGX API to alloc an anon inode
>>>>> for each
>>>>> enclave instead of hanging every enclave off of the
>>>>> /dev/sgx/enclave inode.
>>>>> Because /dev/sgx/enclave is NOT private, SELinux's
>>>>> file_map_prot_check()
>>>>> will only require FILE__WRITE and FILE__EXECUTE to mprotect()
>>>>> enclave VMAs
>>>>> to RWX.  Backing each enclave with an anon inode will make SELinux
>>>>> treat
>>>>> EPC memory like anonymous mappings, which is what we want (I
>>>>> think), e.g.
>>>>> making *any* EPC page executable will require PROCESS__EXECMEM (SGX is
>>>>> 64-bit only at this point, so SELinux will always have
>>>>> default_noexec).
>>>> I don't think we want to require EXECMEM (or equivalently both
>>>> FILE__WRITE and FILE__EXECUTE to /dev/sgx/enclave) for making any
>>>> EPC page executable, only if the page is also writable or previously
>>>> modified.  The intent is to prevent arbitrary code execution without
>>>> EXECMEM (or FILE__WRITE|FILE__EXECUTE), while still allowing
>>>> enclaves to be created without EXECMEM as long as the EPC page
>>>> mapping is only ever mapped RX and its initial contents came from an
>>>> unmodified file mapping that was PROT_EXEC (and hence already
>>>> checked via FILE__EXECUTE).
>>> Also, just to be clear, there is nothing inherently better about
>>> checking EXECMEM instead of checking both FILE__WRITE and
>>> FILE__EXECUTE to the /dev/sgx/enclave inode, so I wouldn't switch to
>>> using anon inodes for that reason.  Using anon inodes also
>>> unfortunately disables SELinux inode-based checking since we no
>>> longer have any useful inode information, so you'd lose out on
>>> SELinux ioctl whitelisting on those enclave inodes if that matters.
>> How can that work?  Unless the API changes fairly radically, users
>> fundamentally need to both write and execute the enclave.  Some of it
>> will be written only from already executable pages, and some privilege
>> should be needed to execute any enclave page that was not loaded like
>> this.
> I'm not sure what the API is. Let's say they do something like this:
> fd = open("/dev/sgx/enclave", O_RDONLY);
> addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
> stuff addr into ioctl args
> ioctl(fd, ENCLAVE_CREATE, &ioctlargs);
> ioctl(fd, ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE, &ioctlargs);
> ioctl(fd, ENCLAVE_INIT, &ioctlargs);
> The important points are that they do not open /dev/sgx/enclave with
> write access (otherwise they will trigger FILE__WRITE at open time, and
> later encounter FILE__EXECUTE as well during mmap, thereby requiring
> both to be allowed to /dev/sgx/enclave), and that they do not request
> PROT_WRITE to the resulting mapping (otherwise they will trigger
> FILE__WRITE at mmap time).  Then only FILE__READ and FILE__EXECUTE are
> required to /dev/sgx/enclave in policy.
> If they switch to an anon inode, then any mmap PROT_EXEC of the opened
> file will trigger an EXECMEM check, at least as currently implemented,
> as we have no useful backing inode information.

FWIW, looking at the selftest for SGX in the patch series, they open
/dev/sgx/enclave O_RDWR (probably not necessary?) and mmap the open file
RWX. If that is necessary then I'd rather it show up as FILE__WRITE and
FILE__EXECUTE to /dev/sgx/enclave instead of EXECMEM, so that we can
allow the process the ability to perform that mmap without allowing it
to make other mappings WX. So staying with the single /dev/sgx/enclave
inode is better in that regard.

 \ /
  Last update: 2019-05-17 21:21    [W:0.267 / U:1.128 seconds]
©2003-2018 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site