lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2019]   [May]   [15]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
From
SubjectRe: [PATCH v20 00/28] Intel SGX1 support
On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 01:45:27PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 08:13:36AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 3:43 AM Jarkko Sakkinen
> > <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 01:29:26PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > I did study through SDK's file format and realized that it does not
> > > > does make sense after all to embed one.
> > > >
> > > > To implement it properly you would probably need a new syscall (lets say
> > > > sgx_load_enclave) and also that enclaves are not just executables
> > > > binaries. It is hard to find a generic format for them as applications
> > > > range from simply protecting part of an application to running a
> > > > containter inside enclave.
> > >
> > > I'm still puzzling what kind of changes you were discussing considering
> > > SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE.
> >
> > I think it's as simple as requiring that, if SECINFO.X is set, then
> > the src pointer points to the appropriate number of bytes of
> > executable memory. (Unless there's some way for an enclave to change
> > SECINFO after the fact -- is there?)
>
> Nit: SECINFO is just the struct passed to EADD, I think what you're really
> asking is "can the EPCM permissions be changed after the fact".
>
> And the answer is, yes.
>
> On SGX2 hardware, the enclave can extend the EPCM permissions at runtime
> via ENCLU[EMODPE], e.g. to make a page writable.

Small correction: it is EMODPR.

Anyway, it is good to mention that these would require EACCEPT from the
enclave side. In order to take advantage of this is in a malicous
enclave, one would require SELinux/IMA/whatnot policy to have permitted
it in the first place.

Thus, it cannot be said that it breaks the security policy if this would
happen because policy has allowed to use the particular enclave.

> Hardware also doesn't prevent doing EADD to the same virtual address
> multiple times, e.g. an enclave could EADD a RX page, and then EADD a
> RW page at the same virtual address with different data. The second EADD
> will affect MRENCLAVE, but so long as it's accounted for by the enclave's
> signer, it's "legal". SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE *does* prevent adding the
> "same" page to an enclave multiple times, so effectively this scenario is
> blocked by the current implementation, but it's more of a side effect (of
> a sane implementation) as opposed to deliberately preventing shenanigans.

If the security policy can define who can create legit SIGSTRUCT files,
this should not be a problem. Neither should be how EEXTEND is used.

This brings me to an open question in Andy's model: lets say that we
change the source for SIGSTRUCT from memory address to fd. How can the
policy prevent the use not creating a file containing a SIGSTRUCT and
passing fd of that to the EINIT ioctl?

If we can sort this question out, then SIGSTRUCT-centered way to control
enclave would actually be robust.

/Jarkko

\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2019-05-15 12:36    [W:0.142 / U:5.436 seconds]
©2003-2018 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site