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SubjectRe: [PATCH RFC 2/5] x86/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options
On Fri, Apr 05, 2019 at 03:57:12PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> > index 2bb3a648fc12..7e95b310f869 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> > @@ -982,6 +982,7 @@ void microcode_check(void);
> >
> > enum l1tf_mitigations {
> > L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF,
> > + L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT,
> > L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN,
> > L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH,
> > L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT,
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > index 2da82eff0eb4..65b95fb95ba5 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > @@ -308,8 +308,11 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
> >
> > ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2_user",
> > arg, sizeof(arg));
> > - if (ret < 0)
> > + if (ret < 0) {
> > + if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
> > + return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
>
> Instead of sprinkling that test in those three functions, just do it
> once above in check_bugs(), before those *_select_mitigation() functions
> get to run and depending on the value, you either run them or use the
> default settings, for the OFF case, for example.

My thinking was that the individual options could be used to override
the global option. But maybe that's overkill? I dunno.

> > return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
> > + }
> >
> > for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(v2_user_options); i++) {
> > if (match_option(arg, ret, v2_user_options[i].option)) {
> > @@ -444,8 +447,11 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
> > return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
> >
> > ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
> > - if (ret < 0)
> > + if (ret < 0) {
> > + if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
> > + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
> > return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
> > + }
> >
> > for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
> > if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
> > @@ -677,8 +683,11 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
> > } else {
> > ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
> > arg, sizeof(arg));
> > - if (ret < 0)
> > + if (ret < 0) {
> > + if (cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
> > + return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
> > return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
> > + }
> >
> > for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {
> > if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))
> > @@ -955,7 +964,7 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
> > #define pr_fmt(fmt) "L1TF: " fmt
> >
> > /* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
> > -enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
> > +enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT;
> > #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
> > #endif
> > @@ -1010,8 +1019,23 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
> >
> > override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
> >
> > + if (l1tf_mitigation == L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT) {
> > + switch (cpu_spec_mitigations) {
> > + case CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF:
> > + l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
> > + break;
> > + case CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO:
> > + l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
> > + break;
> > + case CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT:
> > + l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
> > + break;
> > + }
> > + }
> > +
> > switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
> > case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
> > + case L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT:
> > case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
> > case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
> > break;
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > index ab432a930ae8..83b5bdc3c777 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > @@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
> > case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
> > case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
> > case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
> > + case L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT:
> > l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND;
> > break;
> > case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
> > @@ -6686,6 +6687,7 @@ static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
> > case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
> > case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
> > case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
> > + case L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT:
> > /*
> > * Warn upon starting the first VM in a potentially
> > * insecure environment.
>
> The L1TF bits need to be a separate patch.

I assume you mean just the part where L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT is added?

--
Josh

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