Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon syscall | From | Andy Lutomirski <> | Date | Fri, 26 Apr 2019 11:34:29 -0700 |
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> On Apr 26, 2019, at 7:01 AM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote: > >> On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 11:33:09AM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote: >> Adding Eric and Herbert to continue discussion for the chacha part. >> So, as a short summary I am trying to find out a fast (fast enough to be used per syscall >> invocation) source of random bits with good enough security properties. >> I started to look into chacha kernel implementation and while it seems that it is designed to >> work with any number of rounds, it does not expose less than 12 rounds primitive. >> I guess this is done for security sake, since 12 is probably the lowest bound we want people >> to use for the purpose of encryption/decryption, but if we are to build an efficient RNG, >> chacha8 probably is a good tradeoff between security and speed. >> >> What are people's opinions/perceptions on this? Has it been considered before to create a >> kernel RNG based on chacha? > > Well, sure. The get_random_bytes() kernel interface and the > getrandom(2) system call uses a CRNG based on chacha20. See > extract_crng() and crng_reseed() in drivers/char/random.c. > > It *is* possible to use an arbitrary number of rounds if you use the > low level interface exposed as chacha_block(), which is an > EXPORT_SYMBOL interface so even modules can use it. "Does not expose > less than 12 rounds" applies only if you are using the high-level > crypto interface. > > We have used cut down crypto algorithms for performance critical > applications before; at one point, we were using a cut down MD4(!) for > initial TCP sequence number generation. But that was getting rekeyed > every five minutes, and the goal was to make it just hard enough that > there were other easier ways of DOS attacking a server. > > I'm not a cryptographer, so I'd really us to hear from multiple > experts about the security level of, say, ChaCha8 so we understand > exactly kind of security we'd offering. And I'd want that interface > to be named so that it's clear it's only intended for a very specific > use case, since it will be tempting for other kernel developers to use > it in other contexts, with undue consideration. > >
I don’t understand why we’re even considering weaker primitives. It seems to me that we should be using the “fast-erasure” construction for all get_random_bytes() invocations. Specifically, we should have a per cpu buffer that stores some random bytes and a count of how many random bytes there are. get_random_bytes() should take bytes from that buffer and *immediately* zero those bytes in memory. When the buffer is empty, it gets refilled with the full strength CRNG.
The obvious objection is “oh no, a side channel could leak the buffer,” to which I say so what? A side channel could just as easily leak the entire CRNG state.
For Elena’s specific use case, we would probably want a try_get_random_bytes_notrace() that *only* tries the percpu buffer, since this code runs so early in the syscall path that we can’t run real C code. Or it could be moved a bit later, I suppose — the really early part is not really an interesting attack surface.
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