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SubjectRe: [PATCH v10 2/5] KVM: arm/arm64: context-switch ptrauth registers
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Hi Mark,

On 4/23/19 3:09 PM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On Tue, 23 Apr 2019 05:42:35 +0100,
> Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com> wrote:
>>
>> From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
>>
>> When pointer authentication is supported, a guest may wish to use it.
>> This patch adds the necessary KVM infrastructure for this to work, with
>> a semi-lazy context switch of the pointer auth state.
>>
>> Pointer authentication feature is only enabled when VHE is built
>> in the kernel and present in the CPU implementation so only VHE code
>> paths are modified.
>>
>> When we schedule a vcpu, we disable guest usage of pointer
>> authentication instructions and accesses to the keys. While these are
>> disabled, we avoid context-switching the keys. When we trap the guest
>> trying to use pointer authentication functionality, we change to eagerly
>> context-switching the keys, and enable the feature. The next time the
>> vcpu is scheduled out/in, we start again. However the host key save is
>> optimized and implemented inside ptrauth instruction/register access
>> trap.
>>
>> Pointer authentication consists of address authentication and generic
>> authentication, and CPUs in a system might have varied support for
>> either. Where support for either feature is not uniform, it is hidden
>> from guests via ID register emulation, as a result of the cpufeature
>> framework in the host.
>>
>> Unfortunately, address authentication and generic authentication cannot
>> be trapped separately, as the architecture provides a single EL2 trap
>> covering both. If we wish to expose one without the other, we cannot
>> prevent a (badly-written) guest from intermittently using a feature
>> which is not uniformly supported (when scheduled on a physical CPU which
>> supports the relevant feature). Hence, this patch expects both type of
>> authentication to be present in a cpu.
>>
>> This switch of key is done from guest enter/exit assembly as preparation
>> for the upcoming in-kernel pointer authentication support. Hence, these
>> key switching routines are not implemented in C code as they may cause
>> pointer authentication key signing error in some situations.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
>> [Only VHE, key switch in full assembly, vcpu_has_ptrauth checks
>> , save host key in ptrauth exception trap]
>> Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
>> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
>> Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
>> Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
>> ---
>> Changes since v9:
>>
>> * Removed hardcoding of enum values[Mark Zyngier].
>> * Changed kvm_ptrauth_asm.h to kvm_ptrauth.h[Mark Zyngier].
>> * Removed macro __ptrauth_save_state and applied inline [Marc Zyngier].
>> * Moved kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_setup_lazy, kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_enable and
>> kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_disable from *.c to kvm_emulate.h file [Marc Zyngier].
>> * Added/Modified comments at few places [Marc Zyngier].
>>
>> arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 2 +
>> arch/arm64/Kconfig | 5 +-
>> arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 16 ++++++
>> arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 14 +++++
>> arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h | 108 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 6 ++
>> arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c | 36 +++++++++---
>> arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S | 15 +++++
>> arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 43 +++++++++++++-
>> virt/kvm/arm/arm.c | 2 +
>> 10 files changed, 234 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>> create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
>> index 8927cae..efb0e2c 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
>> +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
>> @@ -343,4 +343,6 @@ static inline unsigned long vcpu_data_host_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> }
>> }
>>
>> +static inline void vcpu_ptrauth_setup_lazy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
>> +
>> #endif /* __ARM_KVM_EMULATE_H__ */
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
>> index 7e34b9e..3cfe2eb 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
>> @@ -1301,8 +1301,9 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
>> context-switched along with the process.
>>
>> The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in
>> - hardware it will not be advertised to userspace nor will it be
>> - enabled.
>> + hardware it will not be advertised to userspace/KVM guest nor will it
>> + be enabled. However, KVM guest also require VHE mode and hence
>> + CONFIG_ARM64_VHE=y option to use this feature.
>
> SVE seems to have the exact same requirements, and has
>
> depends on !KVM || ARM64_VHE
>
> Why don't we have that for PTR_AUTH too?
This point came up earlier also and it was suggested by Dave[1] to
leave userspace ptrauth for non-vhe mode as that would bring regression now.
[1]:https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/3/27/583
>
>>
>> endmenu
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
>> index d384279..613427f 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
>> @@ -98,6 +98,22 @@ static inline void vcpu_set_wfe_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 |= HCR_TWE;
>> }
>>
>> +static inline void vcpu_ptrauth_enable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> +{
>> + vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 |= (HCR_API | HCR_APK);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline void vcpu_ptrauth_disable(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> +{
>> + vcpu->arch.hcr_el2 &= ~(HCR_API | HCR_APK);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static inline void vcpu_ptrauth_setup_lazy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> +{
>> + if (vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu))
>> + vcpu_ptrauth_disable(vcpu);
>> +}
>> +
>> static inline unsigned long vcpu_get_vsesr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> {
>> return vcpu->arch.vsesr_el2;
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> index 7ccac42..7eebea7 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> @@ -161,6 +161,18 @@ enum vcpu_sysreg {
>> PMSWINC_EL0, /* Software Increment Register */
>> PMUSERENR_EL0, /* User Enable Register */
>>
>> + /* Pointer Authentication Registers in a strict increasing order. */
>> + APIAKEYLO_EL1,
>> + APIAKEYHI_EL1,
>> + APIBKEYLO_EL1,
>> + APIBKEYHI_EL1,
>> + APDAKEYLO_EL1,
>> + APDAKEYHI_EL1,
>> + APDBKEYLO_EL1,
>> + APDBKEYHI_EL1,
>> + APGAKEYLO_EL1,
>> + APGAKEYHI_EL1,
>> +
>> /* 32bit specific registers. Keep them at the end of the range */
>> DACR32_EL2, /* Domain Access Control Register */
>> IFSR32_EL2, /* Instruction Fault Status Register */
>> @@ -530,6 +542,8 @@ static inline bool kvm_arch_requires_vhe(void)
>> return false;
>> }
>>
>> +void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>> +
>> static inline void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
>> static inline void kvm_arch_sync_events(struct kvm *kvm) {}
>> static inline void kvm_arch_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) {}
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..f337237
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h
>> @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
>> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
>> +/* arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_ptrauth.h: Guest/host ptrauth save/restore
>> + * Copyright 2019 Arm Limited
>> + * Authors: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
>> + * Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
>> + */
>> +
>> +#ifndef __ASM_KVM_PTRAUTH_H
>> +#define __ASM_KVM_PTRAUTH_H
>> +
>> +#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
>> +
>> +#include <asm/sysreg.h>
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
>> +
>> +#define PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(x) (x - CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1)
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * CPU_AP*_EL1 values exceed immediate offset range (512) for stp instruction
>> + * so below macros takes CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1 as base and calculates the offset of
>> + * the keys from this base to avoid an extra add instruction. These macros
>> + * assumes the keys offsets are aligned in a specific increasing order.
>> + */
>> +.macro ptrauth_save_state base, reg1, reg2
>> + mrs_s \reg1, SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1
>> + mrs_s \reg2, SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1
>> + stp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1)]
>> + mrs_s \reg1, SYS_APIBKEYLO_EL1
>> + mrs_s \reg2, SYS_APIBKEYHI_EL1
>> + stp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APIBKEYLO_EL1)]
>> + mrs_s \reg1, SYS_APDAKEYLO_EL1
>> + mrs_s \reg2, SYS_APDAKEYHI_EL1
>> + stp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APDAKEYLO_EL1)]
>> + mrs_s \reg1, SYS_APDBKEYLO_EL1
>> + mrs_s \reg2, SYS_APDBKEYHI_EL1
>> + stp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APDBKEYLO_EL1)]
>> + mrs_s \reg1, SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1
>> + mrs_s \reg2, SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1
>> + stp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APGAKEYLO_EL1)]
>> +.endm
>> +
>> +.macro ptrauth_restore_state base, reg1, reg2
>> + ldp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1)]
>> + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYLO_EL1, \reg1
>> + msr_s SYS_APIAKEYHI_EL1, \reg2
>> + ldp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APIBKEYLO_EL1)]
>> + msr_s SYS_APIBKEYLO_EL1, \reg1
>> + msr_s SYS_APIBKEYHI_EL1, \reg2
>> + ldp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APDAKEYLO_EL1)]
>> + msr_s SYS_APDAKEYLO_EL1, \reg1
>> + msr_s SYS_APDAKEYHI_EL1, \reg2
>> + ldp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APDBKEYLO_EL1)]
>> + msr_s SYS_APDBKEYLO_EL1, \reg1
>> + msr_s SYS_APDBKEYHI_EL1, \reg2
>> + ldp \reg1, \reg2, [\base, #PTRAUTH_REG_OFFSET(CPU_APGAKEYLO_EL1)]
>> + msr_s SYS_APGAKEYLO_EL1, \reg1
>> + msr_s SYS_APGAKEYHI_EL1, \reg2
>> +.endm
>> +
>> +/* Both ptrauth_switch_to_guest and ptrauth_switch_to_host macros will check for
>
> Comment style.
>
>> + * the presence of one of the cpufeature flag ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH or
>> + * ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF and then proceed ahead with the save/restore
>> + * of Pointer Authentication key registers.
>> + */
>> +.macro ptrauth_switch_to_guest g_ctxt, reg1, reg2, reg3
>> +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH
>> + b 1000f
>> +alternative_else_nop_endif
>> +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF
>> + b 1001f
>> +alternative_else_nop_endif
>> +1000:
>> + ldr \reg1, [\g_ctxt, #(VCPU_HCR_EL2 - VCPU_CONTEXT)]
>> + and \reg1, \reg1, #(HCR_API | HCR_APK)
>> + cbz \reg1, 1001f
>> + add \reg1, \g_ctxt, #CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1
>> + ptrauth_restore_state \reg1, \reg2, \reg3
>> +1001:
>> +.endm
>> +
>> +.macro ptrauth_switch_to_host g_ctxt, h_ctxt, reg1, reg2, reg3
>> +alternative_if ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH
>> + b 2000f
>> +alternative_else_nop_endif
>> +alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF
>> + b 2001f
>> +alternative_else_nop_endif
>> +2000:
>> + ldr \reg1, [\g_ctxt, #(VCPU_HCR_EL2 - VCPU_CONTEXT)]
>> + and \reg1, \reg1, #(HCR_API | HCR_APK)
>> + cbz \reg1, 2001f
>> + add \reg1, \g_ctxt, #CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1
>> + ptrauth_save_state \reg1, \reg2, \reg3
>> + add \reg1, \h_ctxt, #CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1
>> + ptrauth_restore_state \reg1, \reg2, \reg3
>> + isb
>> +2001:
>> +.endm
>> +
>> +#else /* !CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
>> +.macro ptrauth_switch_to_guest g_ctxt, reg1, reg2, reg3
>> +.endm
>> +.macro ptrauth_switch_to_host g_ctxt, h_ctxt, reg1, reg2, reg3
>> +.endm
>> +#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH */
>> +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
>> +#endif /* __ASM_KVM_PTRAUTH_H */
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
>> index 7f40dcb..8178330 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c
>> @@ -125,7 +125,13 @@ int main(void)
>> DEFINE(VCPU_CONTEXT, offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu, arch.ctxt));
>> DEFINE(VCPU_FAULT_DISR, offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu, arch.fault.disr_el1));
>> DEFINE(VCPU_WORKAROUND_FLAGS, offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu, arch.workaround_flags));
>> + DEFINE(VCPU_HCR_EL2, offsetof(struct kvm_vcpu, arch.hcr_el2));
>> DEFINE(CPU_GP_REGS, offsetof(struct kvm_cpu_context, gp_regs));
>> + DEFINE(CPU_APIAKEYLO_EL1, offsetof(struct kvm_cpu_context, sys_regs[APIAKEYLO_EL1]));
>> + DEFINE(CPU_APIBKEYLO_EL1, offsetof(struct kvm_cpu_context, sys_regs[APIBKEYLO_EL1]));
>> + DEFINE(CPU_APDAKEYLO_EL1, offsetof(struct kvm_cpu_context, sys_regs[APDAKEYLO_EL1]));
>> + DEFINE(CPU_APDBKEYLO_EL1, offsetof(struct kvm_cpu_context, sys_regs[APDBKEYLO_EL1]));
>> + DEFINE(CPU_APGAKEYLO_EL1, offsetof(struct kvm_cpu_context, sys_regs[APGAKEYLO_EL1]));
>> DEFINE(CPU_USER_PT_REGS, offsetof(struct kvm_regs, regs));
>> DEFINE(HOST_CONTEXT_VCPU, offsetof(struct kvm_cpu_context, __hyp_running_vcpu));
>> #endif
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
>> index 0b79834..516aead 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/handle_exit.c
>> @@ -173,20 +173,40 @@ static int handle_sve(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
>> return 1;
>> }
>>
>> +#define __ptrauth_save_key(regs, key) \
>> +({ \
>> + regs[key ## KEYLO_EL1] = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ ## key ## KEYLO_EL1); \
>> + regs[key ## KEYHI_EL1] = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ ## key ## KEYHI_EL1); \
>> +})
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Handle the guest trying to use a ptrauth instruction, or trying to access a
>> + * ptrauth register.
>> + */
>> +void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> +{
>> + struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt;
>> +
>> + if (vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu)) {
>> + vcpu_ptrauth_enable(vcpu);
>> + ctxt = vcpu->arch.host_cpu_context;
>> + __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIA);
>> + __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APIB);
>> + __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDA);
>> + __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APDB);
>> + __ptrauth_save_key(ctxt->sys_regs, APGA);
>> + } else {
>> + kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
>> + }
>> +}
>> +
>> /*
>> * Guest usage of a ptrauth instruction (which the guest EL1 did not turn into
>> * a NOP).
>> */
>> static int kvm_handle_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *run)
>> {
>> - /*
>> - * We don't currently support ptrauth in a guest, and we mask the ID
>> - * registers to prevent well-behaved guests from trying to make use of
>> - * it.
>> - *
>> - * Inject an UNDEF, as if the feature really isn't present.
>> - */
>> - kvm_inject_undefined(vcpu);
>> + kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_trap(vcpu);
>> return 1;
>> }
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S
>> index 675fdc1..93ba3d7 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S
>> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
>> #include <asm/kvm_arm.h>
>> #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
>> #include <asm/kvm_mmu.h>
>> +#include <asm/kvm_ptrauth.h>
>>
>> #define CPU_GP_REG_OFFSET(x) (CPU_GP_REGS + x)
>> #define CPU_XREG_OFFSET(x) CPU_GP_REG_OFFSET(CPU_USER_PT_REGS + 8*x)
>> @@ -64,6 +65,13 @@ ENTRY(__guest_enter)
>>
>> add x18, x0, #VCPU_CONTEXT
>>
>> + // Macro ptrauth_switch_to_guest format:
>> + // ptrauth_switch_to_guest(guest cxt, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3)
>> + // The below macro to restore guest keys is not implemented in C code
>> + // as it may cause Pointer Authentication key signing mismatch errors
>> + // when this feature is enabled for kernel code.
>> + ptrauth_switch_to_guest x18, x0, x1, x2
>> +
>> // Restore guest regs x0-x17
>> ldp x0, x1, [x18, #CPU_XREG_OFFSET(0)]
>> ldp x2, x3, [x18, #CPU_XREG_OFFSET(2)]
>> @@ -118,6 +126,13 @@ ENTRY(__guest_exit)
>>
>> get_host_ctxt x2, x3
>>
>> + // Macro ptrauth_switch_to_guest format:
>> + // ptrauth_switch_to_host(guest cxt, host cxt, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3)
>> + // The below macro to save/restore keys is not implemented in C code
>> + // as it may cause Pointer Authentication key signing mismatch errors
>> + // when this feature is enabled for kernel code.
>> + ptrauth_switch_to_host x1, x2, x3, x4, x5
>> +
>> // Now restore the host regs
>> restore_callee_saved_regs x2
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
>> index 7046c76..7f06c2e 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
>> @@ -1007,6 +1007,35 @@ static bool access_pmuserenr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct sys_reg_params *p,
>> { SYS_DESC(SYS_PMEVTYPERn_EL0(n)), \
>> access_pmu_evtyper, reset_unknown, (PMEVTYPER0_EL0 + n), }
>>
>> +static bool trap_ptrauth(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> + struct sys_reg_params *p,
>> + const struct sys_reg_desc *rd)
>> +{
>> + kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_trap(vcpu);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Return is false for both cases and PC remains same,
>> + * a) Re-execute the same key register access instruction after enabling
>> + * ptrauth.
>> + * b) UNDEF is injected as ptrauth is not supported/enabled.
>> + */
>
> This comment is pretty confusing. You say that PC remains the same,
> but that's obviously not true for (b). I've fixed it locally as such:
>
> /*
> * Return false for both cases as we never skip the trapped
> * instruction:
> *
> * - Either we re-execute the same key register access instruction
> * after enabling ptrauth.
> * - Or an UNDEF is injected as ptrauth is not supported/enabled.
> */
>
ok.
>
>> + return false;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static unsigned int ptrauth_visibility(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> + const struct sys_reg_desc *rd)
>> +{
>> + return vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu) ? 0 : REG_HIDDEN_USER | REG_HIDDEN_GUEST;
>> +}
>> +
>> +#define __PTRAUTH_KEY(k) \
>> + { SYS_DESC(SYS_## k), trap_ptrauth, reset_unknown, k, \
>> + .visibility = ptrauth_visibility}
>> +
>> +#define PTRAUTH_KEY(k) \
>> + __PTRAUTH_KEY(k ## KEYLO_EL1), \
>> + __PTRAUTH_KEY(k ## KEYHI_EL1)
>> +
>> static bool access_arch_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> struct sys_reg_params *p,
>> const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
>> @@ -1058,9 +1087,11 @@ static u64 read_id_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) |
>> (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT) |
>> (0xfUL << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT);
>> - if (val & ptrauth_mask)
>> - kvm_debug("ptrauth unsupported for guests, suppressing\n");
>> - val &= ~ptrauth_mask;
>> + if (!vcpu_has_ptrauth(vcpu)) {
>> + if (val & ptrauth_mask)
>> + kvm_debug("ptrauth unsupported for guests, suppressing\n");
>> + val &= ~ptrauth_mask;
>> + }
>> }
>>
>> return val;
>> @@ -1460,6 +1491,12 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = {
>> { SYS_DESC(SYS_TTBR1_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, TTBR1_EL1 },
>> { SYS_DESC(SYS_TCR_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_val, TCR_EL1, 0 },
>>
>> + PTRAUTH_KEY(APIA),
>> + PTRAUTH_KEY(APIB),
>> + PTRAUTH_KEY(APDA),
>> + PTRAUTH_KEY(APDB),
>> + PTRAUTH_KEY(APGA),
>> +
>> { SYS_DESC(SYS_AFSR0_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, AFSR0_EL1 },
>> { SYS_DESC(SYS_AFSR1_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, AFSR1_EL1 },
>> { SYS_DESC(SYS_ESR_EL1), access_vm_reg, reset_unknown, ESR_EL1 },
>> diff --git a/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c b/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c
>> index 7039c99c..156c09d 100644
>> --- a/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c
>> +++ b/virt/kvm/arm/arm.c
>> @@ -385,6 +385,8 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
>> vcpu_clear_wfe_traps(vcpu);
>> else
>> vcpu_set_wfe_traps(vcpu);
>> +
>> + vcpu_ptrauth_setup_lazy(vcpu);
>> }
>>
>> void kvm_arch_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> --
>> 2.7.4
>>
>
> I've tentatively applied these fixes on top of your series, no need to
> resend anything for now.

Thanks,
Amit D.
>
> Thanks,
>
> M.
>

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