Messages in this thread |  | | Subject | Re: kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:434! | From | Casey Schaufler <> | Date | Wed, 17 Apr 2019 17:24:56 -0700 |
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On 4/17/2019 4:39 PM, Paul Moore wrote: > On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 12:27 PM Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote: >> On 04/17, Paul Moore wrote: >>> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 10:57 AM Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote: >>>> On 04/17, Paul Moore wrote: >>>>> I'm tempted to simply return an error in selinux_setprocattr() if >>>>> the task's credentials are not the same as its real_cred; >>>> What about other modules? I have no idea what smack_setprocattr() is, >>>> but it too does prepare_creds/commit creds. >>>> >>>> it seems that the simplest workaround should simply add the additional >>>> cred == real_cred into proc_pid_attr_write(). >>> Yes, that is simple, but I worry about what other LSMs might want to >>> do. While I believe failing if the effective creds are not the same >>> as the real_creds is okay for SELinux (possibly Smack too), I worry >>> about what other LSMs may want to do. After all, >>> proc_pid_attr_write() doesn't change the the creds itself, that is >>> something the specific LSMs do. >> Yes, but if proc_pid_attr_write() is called with cred != real_cred then >> something is already wrong? > True, or at least I would think so. > > Looking at the current tree there are three LSMs which implement > setprocattr hooks: SELinux, Smack, and AppArmor. I know Casey has > already mentioned that he wasn't able to trigger the problem in Smack, > but looking at smack_setprocattr() I see the similar commit_creds() > usage so I would expect the same problem in Smack; what say you Casey?
I say that my test program runs without ill effect. I call acct() with "/proc/self/attr/current", which succeeds and enables accounting just like it is supposed to. I then have the program open "/proc/self/attr/current" and read it, all of which goes swimmingly. When Smack frees a cred it usually does not free any memory of its own, so it is conceivable that I'm just getting lucky. Or, I may not have sufficient debug enabled.
> Looking at apparmor_setprocattr(), it appears that it too could end > up calling commit_creds() via aa_set_current_hat(). > > Since it looks like all three LSMs which implement the setprocattr > hook are vulnerable I'm open to the idea that proc_pid_attr_write() is > a better choice for the cred != read_cred check, but I would want to > make sure John and Casey are okay with that. > > John? > > Casey?
I'm fine with the change going into proc_pid_attr_write().
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