Messages in this thread | | | From | Kees Cook <> | Date | Tue, 16 Apr 2019 18:00:09 -0500 | Subject | Re: [PATCH] random: Move rand_initialize() earlier |
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On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 11:09 AM Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote: > > On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 10:46:34PM -0500, Kees Cook wrote: > > On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 9:45 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > > > > > > On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 7:29 AM, Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote: > > > > On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 03:54:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > > >> Right now rand_initialize() is run as an early_initcall(), but it only > > > >> depends on timekeeping_init() (for mixing ktime_get_real() into the > > > >> pools). However, the call to boot_init_stack_canary() for stack canary > > > >> initialization runs earlier, which triggers a warning at boot: > > > >> > > > >> random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x357/0x548 with crng_init=0 > > > >> > > > >> Instead, this moves rand_initialize() to after timekeeping_init(), and moves > > > >> canary initialization here as well. > > > >> > > > >> Note that this warning may still remain for machines that do not have > > > >> UEFI RNG support (which initializes the RNG pools durting setup_arch()), > > > >> or for x86 machines without RDRAND (or booting without "random.trust=on" > > > >> or CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y). > > > >> > > > >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > > > > Hi Ted! Did this get lost? This has come up again, and I don't see it > > having landed anywhere yet. Can you take this? > > Yeah, sorry, it got lost; my bad. I'll take it and push it out at the > next merge window.
Awesome; thanks!
-- Kees Cook
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